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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s marked a decade of retrenchment in the Supreme Court's
case law governing personal jurisdiction. 1 However, the Court subsequently
avoided the issue for twenty years, from 1990 until 201 0 _2 The Court' s
avoidance of the issue was noteworthy due to both a rapid expansion in
Internet technology and liberalization of trade. 3 No doubt, the Court' s
hesitation was a result of deep divisions within the Court and Justice
Stevens' idiosyncratic views,4 preventing the Court from achieving a clear
majority on difficult issues. 5
Since Justice Stevens' retirement, the Court has returned to the topic
7
and de"cided four personal jurisdiction cases, two in 2011 6 and two in 2014.
8
While the 2011 decisions have already produced considerable comrnentary,
the recent decisions - read in conjunction with the earlier decisions - call
1

See discussion infra Part Ill.
See discussion infra Part IV.a.
3
See Nicastro v. Mcintyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 897 A.2d. 575, 589 (N.J. 2010) ("In the
twenty-two years since Asahi, transnational commerce has accelerated, and we realize more
than ever that we live in a global marketplace."), rev 'd, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (201 I).
4
Rodger D. Citron, The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction ofJus tice
John Paul Stevens, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433, 469 (2011) (hereinafter The Last Common
Law Justice] ("Despite - or more likely because of - his refusal to provide a fifth vote to
any opinion in Asahi or Burnham, the Supreme Court did not revisit the doctri nal disputes at
issue in those cases until after Stevens retired."); Roger D. Citron, The Case of the Retired
Justice: How Would Jus tice John Paul Stevens Have Voted in J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro?, 63 S.C. L. REv. 643, 644 (20 12) (hereinafter The Case of the Retired Justice].
5 See infra pp. 231-235.
6
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J.
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
7
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. I I 15 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014).
R See generally John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of
the Supreme Court's Decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1707 (2013) (analyzing the Nicastro and Goodyear decisions and how they limit the ability of
U.S. citizens to bring suit against foreign defendants for injuries); John T. Parry, Introduction:
Due Process, Boarders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty - Some Thoughts on J. Mcintyre
Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827 (20 12) (providing a critical analysis
of Nicastro and how it has confused the doctrine of general jurisdiction); Collyn A. Peddie, Mi
Casa es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 36 S.C. L. REv . 697 (20 12)
(exploring the reasons for the Goodyear decision limiting jurisdiction and discussing the
possible implications of this decision).
2
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for more commentary.9
The four most recent decisions are unusual in a number of ways. Three
of the cases ~roduced near unanimity, with only one concurring opinion in
those cases. As developed below, the Court's unanimity is surprising
because the Court's case law suggests a continued retrenchment at a time
when one might have expected the liberal wing of the Court to push for a
longer jurisdictional reach for state and federal courts. 11 In addition, in the
Court's two general jurisdiction cases, Justice Ginsburg's opinions signal a
12
significant narrowing of general jurisdiction. Had the Court simultaneously
expanded courts' jurisdictional reach in specific jurisdiction cases, the
narrowing of general jurisdiction might make sense. 13 But the two recent
14
specific jurisdiction cases have not done so.
The most troubling case is J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. 15 It
proved to be the most controversial, producing a deeply divided Court
16
without a majority opinion. But Justice Kennedy's four-justice plurality
opinion suggests a major retrenchment, well beyond the retrenchment of the
1980s. 17 Still in search for an independent rationale for the contacts part of
the due process analysis, Justice Kennedy invokes notions of implied
consent, a theory that has long been discredited. 18 While his o~inion also
suggests a congressional solution to the issue before the Court, 1 given the
0
discord in Congress/ his solution seems unrealistic. Finally, the plurality's
extreme position is especially troubling in light of the division within the
Court: while Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer's concurring opinion/'
Justice Alito's usual alignment with the conservative wing of the Court does

9
See, for example, Judy M. Cornett & M ichael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 75 O HIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming Fall 2014); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court's New Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015), for some commentary that has been

produced by these dec isions.
10
See infra Parts IV.b.i.A, IV.b .i.B, IY.b.ii.B, IV.b.ii.A.
11
See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii.
12 See d iscussion infra Parts IY.b.i.A, IY.b. i.B.
13
See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii.
14
See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii.
15 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
16
See discussion infra Part IY.b .ii.A.
17
See infra pp. 260-262.
18 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (2011); see infr a p. 26 1-262.
19 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
20 Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, The Roots of Congressional Discord, HUFF!NGTON
POST
(Oct. 18, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-debbie-wasserman-schultz
/congress-discord_b_41 23823.html.
21
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring).
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not bode well for future cases.22 If he was convinced to adopt Justice
Kennedy's position, the personal jurisdictional reach of state courts will
shrink to its shortest reach since the days prior to International Shoe Co. v.
Washington at the same time as information and goods flow into states more
freely than at any other time in history.Z3
The jurisdictional reach of American courts is of special interest to
foreign corporations that are intent on gaining access to markets in the
United States. Foreign business representatives often exp.t:ess surprise when
they encounter unique aspects of the American justice system; liberal
discovery provides only one example.Z4 As a result, foreign corporate
representatives may seek to avoid the jurisdiction of American courts.
5
Seemingly, the Court's new case law provides a blueprint to do so.Z
This article explores how the Court's recent case law provides foreign
corporations access to markets in the United States while allowing them to
limit their vulnerability to jurisdiction in American courts. Part II provides a
snapshot of the Court's case law in the modem era, beginning with a passing
reference to Pennoyer v. Ne.Jf 6 and moving to the period after International
Shoe, 21 when the jurisdictional reach of courts in the United States was
dramatically extended. 28 It discusses briefly a notable exception, Hanson v.
Denckla,29 a case so obviously result-oriented that lower courts felt free to
ignore its implications. 3 Further, it discusses alternatives available to a
plaintiff in need of a forum, including commencing suit by property
31
attachment, invocation of general jurisdiction and consent. Part III
discusses a series of cases, mostly in the 1980s, which signaled a

°

22
General William K. Suter, Supreme Court Report, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 333, 337
(20 12) ("The so-called consetvatives are the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito. Chief Justice and Justice Alito voted together about 95% of the time."); see also
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310,316 (2010) (Justice Kennedy
delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Ali to).
23
lnt'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10 (1945). See also infra pp. 270-272.
24
For example, some commentators suggest that UBS officials repeatedly ignored
obligations under federal discovery rules because in their own system, they did not have to
hand over documents that supported their opponents' cases and found compliance wi th such a
rule inappropriate. See, e.g. , Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (imposing significant sanctions for obstructionist behavior).
25
See discussion infra Part V.
26
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 14 ( 1878).
27
lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.
28
See discussion infra Part II.
29 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
30 See infra Part II.d.
31
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 245; see also discussion infra Part II.
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retrenchment by the Court? 2 Part IV discusses the four Supreme Court cases
decided since Justice Stevens' retirement. 33 It concludes that the Court has
shortened the jurisdictional reach of domestic courts at a moment in history
when dramatic changes in communications and commerce bring Americans
into contact with forei~ners and foreign corporations at rates never seen
before in our history? Part V explores the implications of those four
decisions for foreign corporations seeking to do business in the United States
but hoping to avoid litigation in our courts? 5
II.

P ERSONAL JURISDICTION: EXPANDING THE ARMS OF THE STATES

A. A Short History

In conversation with lawyers who are not procedural junkies, I hesitate
to mention Pennoyer v. Neff, lest they storm out or zone out. I mention
Pennoyer in passing because it brought Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis into the law governing personal jurisdiction.36 Scholars disagree
about the original meaning of Pennoyer. 37 But as generally understood, the
Court held38 that a state violated due process if it attempted to assert
jurisdiction over a non-consenting non-resident unless the defendant was
served in hand, in state. Relying primarily on an analogy from international
law, the Court viewed states as separate sovereigns. As such, they exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over individuals and property within their borders. 39
The corollary was that each state's jurisdictional arm ended at its borders.40
In Pennoyer, the lower federal court had to determine whether the
owner of property procured from a federal land grant could proceed against
a defendant who purchased the land at a sheriffs sale pursuant to a default
judgment entered against the owner. 41 The Court found that the defendant
could not rely on full faith and credit, requiring the second court to enforce

32

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.b.
34
See discussion infra Part IV.
35
See discussion infra Part V.
36
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
37
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe's HalfBuried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561 (1995).
38 One could argue that the discussion of due process was dicta. After all, the plaintiff in
the original action filed suit before the effective date of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
Court's subsequent case Jaw makes clear that a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction must
comport with due process.
39
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
40 !d.
33

41

/d. at 720.
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the original judgment.42 It so held because the original judgment was
procured without proper assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the
43
property. Thus, the Court integrated the recently enacted Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause with prior restrictive practice, limiting
states' jurisdictional reach.
The underlying theory - that the Fourteenth Amendment protected one
"sovereign" state's power from overreaching by another state - is
analytically jarring. By its express terms, the Fourteenth Amendment is a
limitation on state power, not a device to protect, for example, California
44
from having Oregon reaching its jurisdictional ann into Califomia.
Treating the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting states' rights is to ignore a
central message of the Civil War. As observed by one historian, until the
Civil War, the United States was referred to in the plural. It was only during
reconstruCtion that reference to the United States shifted to the singular.
Lincoln himself made this shift, consciously using the term "nation" in place
of "union" in the Gettysburg Address, evoking an ideal of the states as
having one national identity rather than being a loose collective of
.
45
soveretgns.
Despite Pennoyer's theoretical weakness, its rigid rule limiting
jurisdiction seldom worked particular hardship on a plaintiff seeking to sue a
defendant during at a time when travel was limited. In an agrarian society,
individual defendants would most often be found near their homes. 46
Pennoyer recognized in dicta that special rules would prevail in other
situations, including in cases involving corporations and other business
entities. The Court suggested that a business entity might be forced to
appoint an agent for the purposes of receiving process or to appoint a public
official for the same purpose. 47
The industrial revolution, with expanded travel and commerce, created

42
43
44

/d. at 729-30.
/d.

See Insurance Corp. of Ireland. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-30 (1982), for the Court's eventual recognition that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
device to protect one state from another' s jurisdictional overreaching.
45
JAY WIN!K, APRIL 1865: THE MONTH THAT SAVED AMERICA 250 (2001). Not only
was Pennoyer's states' rights theory theoretically vulnerable, the Court itself seemed to
recognize as much. Towards the end of the opinion, the Court discussed instances in which a
court could assert jurisdiction even without satisfying the in-hand, in-state rule. Pennoyer, 95
U.S. at 735-36.
46
See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REv.
72 1, 749 (1988). ("Before the advent of modem transportation, when traveling was difficult
and ties between jurisdictions were attenuated, courts justifiably were concerned that
defendants could evade suit by avoiding forums in which potential plaintiffs resided").
47
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.
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situations where Pennoyer's restrictive holding created unfair situations.48
For example, a plaintiff injured by a motorist from out-of-state would have
to travel to the defendant's home state to sue if the defendant left the state
before the plaintiff served the defendant with process. A plaintiff injured by
a defective product shipped from out-of-state was also forced to sue in the
defendant's home state as well.
During the early years of the last century, states used different devices
to expand the jurisdictional reach of their courts, including the now-widely
rejected implied consent theory that allowed a state court to exercise
jurisdiction over a person who conducted business in the state or used state
highways. 49 The need for such fictions changed with the Court's decision in
International Shoe.5° Instead of relying on the fiction of implied consent,5 1
the Court expanded its quid pro quo theory from a case involving the
assertion of jurisdiction based on state residency: a defendant who sought
the benefits and protections of the Jaws of the forum state gives rise to the
obligation to respond to suit in the forum state at least when the claim arose
52
out of the activities in the forum state. As a result, courts must examine the
nature and quality of the defendant' s contacts with the forum state to
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports with " traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. " 53
International Shoe did a number of important things. It stated a theory
of jurisdiction more in sync with the Fourteenth Amendment than did
Pennoyer. The focus shifted from states ' power to fairness to the
defendant. 5 4 It also provided a framework more consonant with modern life
48

McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); see also Olberding et al. v. Illinois Cent.
R. Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) ("[T]o conclude from [the) holding [in Hess] that the
motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is altogether immaterial, has
actually agreed to be sued ... is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland.").
50
Int' l Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51
/d.at 3 18.
52 !d. at 319. See also Miliken v. Meyer, 3 11 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("The state which
accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties").
53 lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 3 16.
54
See Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal ideologies
and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 819, 835 (1 991) ("From the
realist or social-functional perspective, however, International Shoe constructed a new
paradigm that would better serve the social needs and values of contemporary life and
business. Under this view, the meaning of International Shoe is to be determined by looking
beyond words and their dictionary meanings to social, legal, and value contexts. Therefore, the
formulations of International Shoe's minimum contacts/fair-play standard, and 'contacts, ties,
or relations' should not be burdened by territorially loaded concepts or terms. Instead, the
Court should develop this social-functional standard to serve the needs of our modern federal
system and allow the states to effectuate their needs through extraterritorial jurisdictional
49
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than did earlier cases and no longer required reliance on the fiction of
implied consent. Indeed, the jurisdictional reach of state courts was about to
expand dramatically. Imagine a case in which Neff, a California citizen,
calls a lawyer, say, named Mitchell, in Oregon and asks Mitchell to perform
legal services for Neff. When Neff subsequently fails to pay for the legal
services, as long as Oregon has a statute authorizing service of process on a
non-resident, Mitchell could properly bring suit in Oregon without violating
due process. Jurisdiction would be proper even if Neff had never taken a
56
step in Oregon. 55 The Court had come a long way since Pennoyer.

B. The High Water Mark: McGee v. International Life
The process of expansion culminated with the Court's decision in
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 57 There, Lowell Franklin
purchased a life insurance policy from Empire Insurance. Later,
International Life assumed Empire's insurance obligations. 58 When Franklin
died, probably by suicide/ 9 the insurance company refused to pay Lulu
60
McGee, his mother and beneficiary under the policy. McGee sued in

actions. The phrase ' contacts, ties, or relations' should be given a functional interpretation not
limited to activities within the forum or actions outside the forum intentionally causing effects
in the forum ."); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON
HALL L. REv. 807, 813 (2004) ("In the mid-twentieth century, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state's power over those present
within its territory to an analysis of the fairness or reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction
premised on the defendant 's forum contacts.").
ss The facts are, of course, those from Pennoyer. But as the Court observed in Burger
King, a defendant may be subject to the court's jurisdiction even if the defendant never entered
the state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
56
Picking up on International Shoe's implications, in 1962 the Uniform Law
Commissioners drafted a model long-arm statute that attempted to describe categories of cases
where the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with due process. Unif. Interstate & Int' l
Procedure Act, 98 U. L.A. 81 (Supp. 1965) (withdrawn 1977). See also NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 71ST CONFERENCE HANDBOOK OF THE NAT' L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING 219 (1962). While some states adopted the model law, others simply allowed for
service of process on non-resident defendants as long as the assertion of jurisdiction comports
with due process; see, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209 (2014) (adopti ng the model law); N.Y.
C.L.P.R. 302 (2014) (also adopting the model law); Cal. Civ. Code§ 410.10 (20 14) ("A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States. "); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065 (20 14) ("A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction over a party to a civil action on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.").
57
McGee v. lnt' l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 ( 1957).
58 /d. at 221.
59
Death Certificate of Lowell Franklin, Dec. I , 1950 (on file with author).
60
McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
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California, where International Life did not appear. After she obtained a
default judgment, she filed a collection action in Texas, where International
62
Life had its principal place of business. The Texas courts refused to give
the California judgment full faith and credit because the California court
63
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
64
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in a terse opinion. The
operative facts were few:
(After International Life assumed Empire' s obligations]
[r]espondent .. . mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin
in California offering to insure him in accordance with the
terms of the policy he had with Empire Mutual. He accepted
this offer and from that time until his death . . . paid
premiums by mail from his California home to respondent's
Texas office . . . . It appears that neither Empire nor
respondent has ever had any office or agent in California.
And so far as the record before us shows, respondent has
never solicited or done any insurance business in California
65
apart from the policy involved here.
Thus, the Court had to determine whether jurisdiction violated due process
when the only contact with the forum state was a single insurance contract,
which arguably the defendant had breached by its refusal to pay.
The Court reviewed the history of personal jurisdiction and recognized
the "trend [that] is clearly discernible [is] toward expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations."66 The reasons were
obvious. Commerce had become nationalized, commercial transactions
could occur through the use of the mails across the continent, and modem
67
transportation and communication reduced the burden on a defendant.
Justice Black's opinion changed the way in which the Court viewed
jurisdictional analysis and brought it more in line with due process than did
Pennoyer. The Court made passing references to the fact that International
Life solicited Lowell Franklin's business when it sent him the certificate of
reinsurance.68 Nothing in the opinion suggested that was a necessary

61

62
63
64

/d. at 221.
Jd.
/d.

Chief Justice Warren took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22.
66
Jd. at 223.
67
/d.
68 !d. at 22 1. There is some irony in the fact that Justice Black authored the opinion. In
his concurring opinion in International Shoe, Justice Black criticized the due process approach
taken there that focused on fair play and substantial justice, consistent with his critique of
65
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condition. ill fact, the Court's analysis would apply with equal force even if
Franklin had written illtemational Life to seek renewal of his insurance
policy. That is so because of the Court's priq~ary emphasis on the minimal
burden on the defendant in the modem era. 69 Even if the Court found the
hypothetical case more difficult, it probably would have come to the same
result. McGee - decided unanimously by the eight Justices hearing the case
- was an easy case. 70 McGee also focused on an overall assessment of the
suitability of the forum. It looked to the needs of the plaintiff, convenience
for witnesses, and the forum state's interest in the litigation. 71
The particular emphasis on the burden to the defendant was more
consistent with the concept of due process than was Pennoyer's view that
due process was somehow linked to states' interest in preventing sister states
from interfering with their sovereignty. 72 McGee focused on procedural due
process: given the level of the burden on the defendant, did the defendant
have adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard?73 That interpretation of
due process is consistent with the terms "due process;" that is, did the court
provide a litigant with procedural faimess? 74 It was also consistent with the
substantive due process. Int' l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945) (Black, J.,
concurring).
69
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
70
/d. at 221.
71
ld. at 223-2.
72
Reynolds, supra note 54, at 876-77 (1991) ("While jurists and scholars under the
influence of the Pennoyer paradigm like to regard McGee as an exceptional case and the high
water mark under the International Shoe standards, from a social-functional perspective,
McGee is neither a high nor a low water mark. It is simply a case where the Court properly
applied the social-functional method in which the forum state's legitimate needs and policy
concerns are of primary importance, and in which the territorialized concept of defendants '
purposeful availment of forum benefits was not the touchstone of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
A social-functional critique reveals that Pennoyer's progeny - in rem, quasi in rem, transient
jurisdiction, implied consent, and presence - are all expressions of the forum state's perpetual
need and interest in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with matters of legitimate
concern. Though these devices have been traditionally viewed as merely exceptions to, or
minor deviations from the basic territorial principle of Pennoyer, and applied in ways that
seem to make them consistent with Pennoyer, all these doctrines are evidence of the social
infirmity of Pennoyer's territorial jurisdiction notion. Pennoyer's jurisdictional progeny were
social-functional actions. The attempts to rationalize these exceptions with Pennoyer involved
transparent fictions. The emphasis in these exceptions on things, people, or actions in the
forum placated only formalist minds.").
73
McGee, 355 U.S. at 224.
74
Richard B. Saphire, SpecifYing Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Ill, 113 (1978) ("In its procedural
aspect, due process has typically been viewed as setting the conditions, if any, which must
attach to deprivatory governmental action. When operative, these conditions have normally
been defined in terms of a requirement of some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard prior
to adverse governmental action.").
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emerging view of due process during the Warren Court years. 75 And again,
although the Court quoted language from International Shoe to the effect
that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state,
McGee did not give special emphasis to the importance of states'
76
boundaries.
Some contemporary scholars interpreted McGee as adopting a rule akin
77
to choice of law rules. Under such an analysis, the balance of several
factors might weigh in favor of the assertion of jurisdiction even if a
defendant had not directed business activity towards the forum state.
Imagine, for example, a case in which a defendant had not directed activity
to the forum state but where the plaintiff had a strong need for the particular
forum and the forum state had a compelling interest to hear the case. If the
burden on the defendant was slight, given the ease of modern
communication and transportation, jurisdiction over the defendant might not
offend due process. 78 Or one might have thought so.
C. Hard Cases Make Bad Law with a Vengeance: Hanson v. Denckla

A Delaware trust company created a trust for Mrs. Donner, a
Pennsylvania domiciliary. 79 Thereafter, she moved to Florida. 80 Over the
next eight years, the trust company maintained the business relationship with
its client, managing the trust and sending income checks to her in Florida. 81
Once in Florida, Mrs. Donner made a number of decisions involving the

75
See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(finding that wage garnishment without hearing violates procedural due process, the court did
not base its decision on whether a wage earner's interest in said wages was fundamental or
non-fundamental (substantive due process)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 ( 1970)
(discontinuing a welfare recipient's benefits without a prior hearing violated procedural due
process).
76
McGee , 355 U.S. at 222.
77
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1148-50 ( 1966) ("These developments have conduced to a
rethinking of the field 's methodology; they have considerably undermined the traditional
jurisdictional premise that the plaintiff should seek out the defendant; and they have . . .
increased the temptations toward parochial choice-of-law thinking ... ").
78 /d. ("The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there
and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California
has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims .... When claims were small or moderate individual claimants
frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum - thus in effect
making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses - as here on the company's
defense of suicide - will be found in the insured's locality.").
79
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238 (1958).
80
!d. at 239.
81
/d. at 252.
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distribution of her estate. 82 She left the bulk of her estate to two of her
daughters, Katherine Denckla and Dorothy Stewart. 83 Named as re.sidual
84
legatees, they were to share an inheritance of about $1,000,000. Around
the same time, Mrs. Donner also exercised the power of appointment under
the Delaware trust and created two trusts, each in the amount of $200,000
for the two sons of her third daughter, Elizabeth Hanson.85 Mrs. Donner's
donative intent seemed obvious: she was dividing her estate roughly into
three parts, with each daughter or in Elizabeth's case, her children, receiving
about a third of Mrs. Donner's assets.
In a story reminiscent of King Lear, two of Mrs. Donner's daughters
86
sought to frustrate Mrs. Donner's attempts to divide her assets equally. In
Florida court proceedings to divide Mrs. Donner's assets, Denckla and
Stewart, the residual legatees, argued that the trust was invalid, resulting in
87
the trust assets becoming part of Mrs. Donner's estate and passing to them.
They sought to make the Delaware trust company a party to the suit in
Florida. 88 While the proceedings were still pending in Florida, Hanson
brought an action in Delaware to have the trust declared valid. 89 The Florida
court ruled for Denckla and Stewart; the Delaware court ruled for Hanson. 90
The Court faced several difficult issues, including whether the oust
company was a "necessary and indispensable" party in the Florida
proceeding,91 whether the case was governed by in rem principles,92 and
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause was relevant to the dispute. 93
However, the Court focused on the question of whether personal jurisdiction
was proper over the trust company in the Florida case.94
Decided six months after McGee, the case seemed to come within its
holding. 95 The burden on the Delaware trust company seemed minimal, no
greater than the burden on International Life. The trust company had
maintained a long business relationship with Mrs. Donner after she moved to
Florida. Surely Florida and the Florida litigants had an interest in a
82

83
84

85

86
87
88

89
90
91

92
93

94
95

!d. at 239.
I d. at 239-40.
I d. at 240.
ld.
/d.
ld.

ld. at 241.
I d. at 242.
/d.

/d. at 244-45.
Jd. at 245-50.
ld. at 255.
ld. at 250-52.
Jd. at 260 n.4.
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convenient forum. 96 But the effect of applying McGee would have been to
reward the two sisters who seemed determined to overturn their mother's
donative intent for their own gain.
Chief Justice Warren wrote for a narrow majority.97 His opinion made
clear his view of the two sisters' venality: "[r]esiduary legatees Denckla and
Stewart, already the recipients of over $500,000 each, urge that the power of
appointment over the $400,000 appointed to sister Elizabeth's children was
not 'effectively exercised' and the property should accordingly pass to
them."98
Hanson v. Denckla included a number of important points that the
Court has largely overlooked when it resurfaced in the 1980s. For example,
the Chief Justice suggested that the claim did not arise out of the contacts
with the forum state.99 In current terminology, were that the case,
jurisdiction was not proper under a specific jurisdiction theory. 100
The Court did not rest there. Instead, it focused on the nature of the trust
company's contacts with the forum state. Those contacts came about through
101
Mrs. Donner's ''unilateral activity." As a result, the trust company did not
purposefull6: avail itself of the benefits of doing business with its customer
in Florida.1 2 In what would appear to be a revision of its holding in McGee,
according to the Chief Justice, McGee turned on the fact that International
Life "solicited a reinsurance agreement in" the forum state. 103 As discussed
above, McGee mentioned the fact as one of a number of reasons why
jurisdiction was proper, but hardly made it a necessary condition for the
assertion of jurisdiction. 104
As developed below, the Court and lower courts often ignored Hanson
for over twenty years. 105 No doubt, courts did so for a number of reasons,
including the obvious result-orientation of the decision. But that would all
change when the Court began its retrenchment in 1980. 106

96

/d. at 259.
Id. (5-4 decision).
98
/d. at 240 (emphasis added).
99
!d. at 25 1.
100 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 13 1 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
1o1
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
102
/d. at 253-54.
103
/d. at 251 -52.
104
McGee v. Int' l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 22 1 (1957). See also supra p. 2 18.
105 See infra Part II.d. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 ( 1977), for the Court's
first citation of Hanson .
106 See infra Part III.b.
97
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D. A Look at State Courts

State judges often favored expanding the jurisdictional reach of their
courts in the post-McGee era. Finding an explanation for the expansion of
jurisdiction by the lower courts is not difficult. Relieved from the narrow
constraints of Pennorer, state courts were eager to protect their citizens from
out-of-state actors. 10 That populist attitude was summarized by former West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely in a different context when
he stated:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-ofstate companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue
to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone
else's money away, but" so is my job security, because the instate plaintiffs, their families and their friends will re-elect
me.108
Almost certainly, the same sentiment underlies the dramatic expansion of
states' jurisdictional reach. State courts did so in two notable ways. First,
even if the state had in place a limited long-arm statute, many state courts
read those statutes as if they stated, simply, that the state could exercise
jurisdiction to the full extent of due process.109 The second way in which
they expanded jurisdiction was by ignoring Hanson.110
The facts of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitmy Corp.
demonstrate the latter point. 111 There, Titan Valve, an Ohio corporation,
manufactured a valve that it shipped to American Radiator in
Pennsylvania. 112 American Radiator incorporated the valve into a hot water
heater that it presumably shipped to Illinois. 11 3 There, the hot water heater
exploded, injuring the plaintiff, Mrs. Gray .114 The plaintiff joined as co107

Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 76 1, 763 (lll. 196 1) . In
more recent years, business interests have poured millions of dollars into judicial campaigns,
often resulting in the election of business friendly judges. See Caperton v. A .T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), for the most egregious example.
108
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED
FROM THE POLITlCS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988).
109
See s upra text accompanying notes 66-67.
110
See infra text accompanying notes 112-122. Not all courts ignored Hanson , but courts
interested in expanding j urisdiction often did so, especially in cases involving contacts that
came about via the stream of commerce. Gray is a textbook example where that was the case.
There, the court cited Hanson, but not for its implications for the purposeful availment aspect
of the analysis. Instead, it distinguished Hanson as a case where the contact was unrelated to
the claim for relief. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
111
Gray, 176 N.E.2d 76 1.
112
ld at 762.
113
ld at 762, 764.
114
Jd at 762.
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defendants American Radiator and Titan.115
Titan moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 116 Had the state
courts followed Hanson, Titan 's argument that the assertion of jurisdiction
violated due process would have been strong because Titan did not direct
any purposeful activity towards the forum state. 117 Instead, it shipped its
product to Pennsylvania. The valve ended up in the forum through the
activity of a third party, akin to Mrs. Donner's decision to move to Florida.
The record was silent on whether any other Titan products ended up in
Illinois but the court was willing to assume that many Titan valves did so. 118
The court found that products arriving in the forum through the stream of
commerce made the assertion of jurisdiction over Titan fair and
reasonable. 11 9
The result in Gray makes sense if McGee's view of due process is at
work: Titan's corporate counsel could hardly claim that the corporation was
unduly burdened if it had to respond to suit in Illinois. A phone call could
have secured local counsel; documents required in discovery could have
been mailed; and if witnesses needed to attend the trial, they could have
flown or driven on the then-emerging interstate highway system, less than
400 miles away. 120 And as indicated, the courts that were ignoring Hanson
would have had good reasons to do so, if they had been forced to articulate
their reasoning. It looked like a sport in the law, an aberrational decision, not
121
entitled to precedential value.
E. In Rem Actions, General Jurisdiction, and Consent

During the pre-International Shoe era, in rem jurisdiction provided a
plaintiff some relief from having to travel far from home as long as the
122
defendant owned in-state property. As long as the value of the property
exceeded the plaintiff's claim, in rem jurisdiction filled a need. 123
Harris v. Balk provides a classic example whereby a plaintiff seeking to
115
116

117
118

Jd.
ld.
Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. , 176 N.E.2d 76 1, 766 (Ill.

196 1).
Jd.
DISTANCE BETWEEN CITIES, http://www.distancebetweencities.net/il_and_oh/ (last
visited June 17, 2014).
121
See discussion supra Part II.d.
122
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("The availability of in rem
proceedings obviated the need for plaintiffs to bring actions in personam that tested the outer
limits of general jurisdiction.").
123
Id. at 7 ("Corporations with assets in a state were subject to general jurisdiction to the
extent of those assets.").
119
120
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sue an out-of-state defendant could use a property attachment to stay at
124
home.
There, Balk from North Carolina owed money to Epstein, a
Maryland resident. 125 Harris, also from North Carolina, owed money to
126
Balk. Unable to find Balk in Maryland, EJ?stein began his suit by serving
Harris when he was traveling in Maryland. 1 In effect, he attached the debt
owed to Balk.
The theoretical justification for in rem jurisdicti.o n would erode as the
Court moved away from formalism to legal realism. 128 But it was premised
on the same theory of sovereignty relied on in Pennoyer: the state where the
property was located bad exclusive jurisdiction over the property within its
129
borders. Similarly formalistic, according to the courts, in rem jurisdiction
was an action against the property, not the owner. 130 Again, apart from the
questionable foundation for in rem jurisdiction, it provided a gap-filler for a
plaintiff who was unable fmd an in-state defendant. 131
General jurisdiction, the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant on a
claim that does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the
forum state almost certainly has historical roots. As observed by the Court in
Pennoyer, establishing jurisdiction over a corporation presented the courts a
distinct query. There, the Court observed that "a State, on creating
corporations . . . , may provide a mode in which their conduct may be
investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked." 132 In the
Pennoyer era, corporations were subject to jurisdiction in their state of
incorporation. 133 By 1945, when the Court decided International Shoe,
courts had also held that under some circumstances a corporation was
subject to personal jurisdiction on a claim unrelated to forum contacts if the
contacts were sufficiently substantial. 134
Despite the recognition that sufficient contacts with the forum may
124
125
126
121
128

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215,223-24 (1905).
!d. at 22 1.
!d.
!d.

Shaffer v . Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,722 (1878).
130
!d. at 721-22.
131
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6-7) ("Before 1977, U.S. courts
routinely exercised general jurisdiction under the guise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.").
132
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36.
133
Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 4 7 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 999, 1004 (2012) ("Jurisdiction over corporations was not as easy or obvious. The
conceptual difficulty, which preceded Pennoyer, coincided with the law's evolving treatment
of the corporate structure. In the early nineteenth century, courts considered corporations
incapable of acting beyond the borders of the state in which they were incorporated. Because a
corporation could act only in its state of incorporation, jurisdiction was limited to that state.").
134
lnt' l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 3 18 ( 1945).
129
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support )urisdiction in that forum, Supreme Court precedent has been
13
sparse.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company arose under
unusual circumstances: the claim arose during World War II based on
conduct in the Philippine Islands, during Japanese occupation. 136 The
president of the corporation, who was also the general manager and principal
shareholder, set up business in Ohio where "he maintained an office in
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the
company." 137 Specifically, he maintained the office files; he carried on
correspondence for the company; he drew checks there for employees and
138
An Ohio bank acted as the
carried substantial balances in local banks.
139
transfer agent for the company. Directors ' meetings were held there. The
president also supervised policies dealing with property in the Philippines. 140
The facts presented the majority with an easy case and found that
141
jurisdiction was proper. Two Justices dissented on other grounds, dealing
with the doctrine of independent and adequate state law grounds for a
142
decision.
Justice Burton's opinion spoke both broadly and narrowly. For
example, in framing the issue at the outset, the Court described the relevant
facts: the corporation was "carrying on a continuous and systematic, but
143
limited, part of its general business."
In framing its analysis, the Court
stated, "The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one
144
of general fairness to the corporation." It concluded that the president of
the company "carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of
the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company." 145
146
While the Court has decided few feneral jurisdiction cases, plaintiffs
14
As indicated, courts have upheld
often rely on general jurisdiction.
jurisdiction based solely on the substantial contact that corporate defendants
148
have established with the forum state.
135
136
137
138
139
140
14 1
142

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011 ).
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,447-48 ( 1952).
/d. at 448.
!d.
/d.
!d.
/d.

!d. at 449-50. (Minton, J., dissenting).
!d. at 438.
144
!d. at 445.
145
/d. at 448.
146
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2 854 (20 I 1).
147
B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 111 1-14
(1990) (describing ways in which plaintiffs have assetted general jurisdiction).
148
/d.
143
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A plaintiff seeking to sue a corporation could also rely on consent.
Many states have in place legislation that requires corporations to apgoint an
50
agent to receive process as a condition of doing business in state.
Such
legislation varies from state to state. Some states limit consent to claims
arising out of forum activity, 15 1 while others make consent binding for any
claims against the corporation. 152
Thus, in the period between 1945 (possibly earlier) and the late 1970s, a
plaintiff commencing suit could rely on any number of bases for asserting
jurisdiction. Modem long-arm statutes reached well beyond the borders of
the state where the plaintiff sought to sue and due process analysis had kept
abreast. 153 A plaintiff could also rely on more traditional bases of
154
jurisdiction, including in rem, general jurisdiction, and consent.
But
155
.
.
b
.
f
I1hgants were a out to enter a penod o retrenchment.
149
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction ofState Courts, from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578
(1957) ("[S]ince a foreign corporation could not carry on business within a state without the
permission of that state, the state could impose as a condition of engaging in business within
its borders a requirement that the corporation appoint an agent to receive service of process
within that state.").
ISO Brilmayer et al. , supra note 46, at 757 ("The most formidable constitutional issue
surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when consent derives from a statutorily
required appointment").
l Si
Jd. at 757 n.I87 ("In some states, statutory consent only applies to suits arising from
the defendant's fon1m activity. See Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 361 F.2d
43, 49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 83 1 (1966); Williams v. Williams, 62 1 S.W.2d 567,
569-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).").
12
s /d. at 757-58. ("Other courts, however, have almost eliminated minimum contacts
analysis for defendants that have appointed agents. The court in Cowan v. Ford Motor Co.
summarily concluded that ' by appointing a resident agent and conducting substantial business
in Mississippi, the defendant has consented to Mississippi's exercise of personal jurisdiction.'
The opinion fai ls to reveal what those substantial contacts were, preferring simply to state in a
footnote that 'sufficient contacts indisputably are present. ' Even conclusory assertions of
connections to the forum are lacking from some opinions that have based general jurisdiction
wholly on the defendant' s statutory appointment of an agent. In a brief opinion, the court in
Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co. held that Texas courts could entertain a suit against a foreign
corporation for property damages suffe red in a truck crash in Louisiana. Noting service on the
defendant's resident agent, the court explained that ' the rationale behind the theory of consent
is that in return for the privilege of doing business in the state, and enjoying the same rights
and privileges as a domestic corporation, the foreign corporation has consented to amenability
to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits within the state.' The court in Junction Bit & Tool
Co. v. Institution Mortgage Co. went so far as to say that 'minimum contacts would seem
patently established' when a 'foreign corporation has actually qualified under Florida law to
transact business in the state and has appointed a resident agent for service of process' as the
Florida statute required.") (footnotes omitted).
ISJ
See supra Part li .d.
154 See supra Part II.e.
ISS
See discussion infra Part III.
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III. THE FIRST RETRENCHMENT

A.

The Late 1970s

The Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson in
1980 marks the beginning of its retrenchment. One might argue that two
cases in the late 1970s signaled the Court's intent to narrow jurisdiction. 156
But neither decision appeared to challenge most liberal efforts to extend the
. . d.Jctwna
.
l reac h o f state courts. 157
JUns
The exgansion of personal jurisdiction was the result of changed
conditions. 1 These changed conditions also led to the rejection of the
nineteenth century formalism reflected in Pennoyer.159 Even before the
Court addressed the continued vitality of in rem jurisdiction, the Court had
undercut the rationale for the doctrine. Pennoyer explained the theory
allowing suit by property attachment as being consistent with the theory
borrowed from international law that a sovereign has exclusive jurisdiction
over property within its borders. 160 As discussed above, modem case law
eroded that theory. 161 In the days of legal formalism, one mi~ht argue that
the action was against the property, not against the individual.' 2 But that did
not withstand scrutiny. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
the Court effectively held that the distinction between in rem and in
personam no longer had significarJce when the question was whether the

156

Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978) ; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186

(1977).
157

See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("The Court held in Shaffer
v. Heitner that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated due process in the absence of minimum
contacts. Justice Marshall required broadly that ' all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.' But no
one at that time thought general jurisdiction was limited to a corporation's base of operations,
and Justice Marshall would have been astonished to learn that his words would one day have
the effect of eliminating state power over large corporations active in states where they were
routinely required to answer lawsuits in 1977."). See also Kulko v. Superior of Court of
California, 436 U.S. 84 ( 1978) (focused on the effect of jurisdiction on family disputes).
158
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,222-23 (1957).
159
See Reynolds, supra note 54, at 824-36 (detailing the changing conditions leading to a
change in legal theories).
160
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 14,729 (1878).
161
See supra Part II.a; see also David Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The
Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1757, 1761 -65 (2014) ("It remains unclear why the [Pennoyer] Court thought it could apply
international1aw to invalidate a state court judgment ... ").
162
Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the
Anitcybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, II GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 255 (2002) ("[A)n
in rem action traditionally was considered to be formally directed at property, not the
defendant personally.").
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notice provided comported with due process. 163 As summarized by the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, "The phrase, 'judicial
jurisdiction over a thing' , is a customary elliptical way of referring to
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." 164
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court brought in rem jurisdiction in line with
in personam jurisdiction. 165 There, the plaintiff brought an action in
Delaware by attaching shares of stocks owned by some of the directors of
the Greyhound Corporation. 166 The claim arose out of conduct occurring in
Oregon and the record was silent on other contacts between the defendants
and Delaware. 167 The Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction on the
basis of the property attachment, standing alone, violated due process. 168 In
broadly worded dicta, the Court stated that all assertions of jurisdiction must
169
satisfy due process as developed in International Shoe and its progeny.
Shaffer did not seem to presage a retrenchment. As indicated, its
17
Further, in Fuentes v.
holding was signaled years earlier in Mullane.
Shevin, the Court had already made pre-judgment attachment of property
more difficult by requiring some kind of hearing. 171 In addition, the need for
property attachments became less important in light of the movement
towards liberalized in personam jurisdiction. 172
The other decision in the late 1970s that might have signaled a
retrenchment in the Court's ~ersonal jurisdiction case law was Kulka v.
Superior Court of California. 73 There, the defendant's ex-wife moved to
California from New York and the defendant acquiesced in his children's
request to live with their mother in California. 174 The defendant's ex-wife
sued him for child support in a California state court. 175 The majority held
that the assertion of jurisdiction violated due process, partially relying on
Hanson. 176 But Kulko did not seem to signal a major movement towards

°

163

164
165

166
167
168

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 ( 1950).
RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, INTRODUCTORY NOTE ( 197 1).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 ( 1977).
/d. at 189-90.
/d.

/d. at 209.
!d. at 207-08.
170
See supra text accompanying note 164.
171
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 ( 1972).
172
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("After in rem actions became
subordinated to due process limits governing actions in personam, courts began to address
substantive limits on general jurisdiction irrespective of the form of litigation").
173
Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
174
!d. at 87-88.
175
/d. at 88.
176
/d. at 94.
169
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limiting jurisdiction for at least two reasons. First, while the Court did fmd
that the defendant's contacts did not come about through his purposeful
conduct, the Court treated that as only one factor. 177 It also considered
whether the assertion of jurisdiction might be constitutional based on an
assessment of the effects of his conduct and the reasonableness of the
178
assertion of jurisdiction.
Second, the Court distinguished the facts in
Kulka from those in cases involving business transactions. 179 Thus, the clear
suggestion was that Kulko was cabined to domestic relations cases. 180

B. The 1980s
1.

Specific Jurisdiction
181

Harry and Kay Robinson bought an Audi in New York. A year later,
while they were on their way to Arizona, Harry was driving a moving
182
truck. While Kay and their children were driving through Oklahoma in the
183
Audi, a drunk driver rear-ended them. The occupants were trapped inside
184
the vehicle and severely bumed. The plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma
state court where they joined as co-defendants Audi, Volkswagen of
America, Seaway (the dealer), and World-Wide Volkswagen (the distributor

Id.
Id. at 96. As observed by one scholar, Kulka seemed to be an outlier. See Earl M.
Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1043, 1064 (1986).
179 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97 ("The cause of action herein asserted arises, not from the
defendant's commercial transactions in interstate commerce, but rather from his personal,
domestic relations. It thus cannot be said that appellant has sought a commercial benefit from
solicitation of business from a resident of California that could reasonably render him liable to
suit in state court; appellant's activities cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer's sending an
insurance contract and premium notices into the State to an insured resident of the State.").
180 Duncan E. Barber, Minimum Contacts in Single Contract Cases: Burger King Has Irs
Way, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 505, 509-10 (1986) ("For example, in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., defendant's solicitation of an insurance contract with a forum resident
established a substantial connection between defendant and the forum because of the
defendant's deliberate solicitation within the forum. Jurisdiction was therefore appropriate.
However, when 'deliberate affiliation' is lacking the Court has been reluctant
to find jurisdiction. Thus, the Court denied jurisdiction in Kulka v. Superior Court, reasoning
that defendant's acquiescence to his daughter' s decision to live in the forum could not be
analogized to seeking 'a commercial benefit from solicitation of business from a resident of
California."').
181 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,288 (1980).
182 Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson - The Rest of the Story, 72
NEB.L.REV. ll 22, 1123(1993).
l83
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288.
184 ld.
177

178
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for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut). 185 Audi and Volkswagen
eventually conceded personal jurisdiction,186 but Seaway and World-Wide
pursued their jurisdictional challenge in the Supreme Court. 187
Oklahoma seemed like a convenient forum. Even Justice White seemed
to acknowledge that fact in his majority opinion. 188 He recognized that the
burden on the defendant, which was the primary focus of the Court's test,
"will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors." 189 But the Court did not consider whether the burden on the
defendants was outweighed by other factors. Instead, relying on Hanson , the
Court held that a threshold question was whether the defendants had
purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of OkJahoma. 190
The Court rejected the idea that jurisdiction would be proper even if a
defendant would suffer no or little inconvenience by litigating in the forum
because due process would be violated. 191 To so conclude, the Court had to
find a rationale for why p~oseful contacts with the forum, not the burden
on the defendant, mattered. 92 Recognizing that the Court had abandoned
"the shibboleth" of Pennoyer that each state is limited by its territorial
borders, the Court needed to find a continued justification for the purposeful
availment aspect of Hanson. 193 While the overall analysis focused on due
process, the Court has "never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes," nor could the Court do so while
remaining "faithful to principles of interstate federalism embodied in the
Constitution." 194 Thus, even if all of the factors relied on by the Court in
McGee favored jurisdiction in the forum state, absent the necessary contacts
with the forum state, jurisdiction would be improper.195 That was so because
196
"the Due Process Clause, act[s] as an instrument of interstate federalism."
Within two years, even Justice White, the author of World-Wide,
recognized the inadequacy of that theory.197 Due process does not advance

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

(1 982).

!d. at 288-29.
!d. at 288 n.3.
/d. at 288.
/d. at 294.
/d. at 292.
/d. at 297.
/d. at 294.
/d.
/d. at 293.
/d.
/d. at 294.
/d.
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 695
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states' interests. 198 Further, were the Due Process Clause a way to protect a
state's interest, the Court would have to explain why a defendant can waive
199
an objection to personal jurisdiction. Instead, because the interest would
seemingly be the state's interest, one would expect that the Court should
treat the matter as it does subject matter jurisdiction, not subject to waiver by
. to the smt.
. 200
the parties
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, Justice White confessed error.201 There, he explained that the
personal jurisdiction requirement "protects an individual liberty interest. It
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty."202
As developed below, once the interstate federalism rationale dropped
out of the equation, the Court has not offered much of an explanation for
why contacts with the forum state are a necessary condition for the assertion
of jurisdiction. 203 Attemrots at an explanation seem to fall back on implied
consent to jurisdiction. 04 Thus, a defendant from Memphis, Tennessee
cannot be compelled to respond to a suit in West Memphis, Arkansas - a
short drive across the Mississippi River - but can be compelled to respond
to a suit almost 400 miles away in Knoxville; Tennessee. Obviously, the
minimum contacts are not about convenience to the defendant, but are about
something else altogether.
World-Wide signaled battle lines within the Court.Z05 Always favoring
expanded jurisdiction, Justice Brennan dissented in World-Wide. 206 In
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, Justice Brennan would concede that, at a
minimum, the Constitution requires some minimum contacts.Z07 His World-

198

/d. at 704.
!d. at 703-04.
200
/d. at 703.
201
/d. at 701.
202 !d. at 702.
203
See infra text accompanying notes 206-1 3.
204 Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law:
A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 907, 912-13 (1981) (arguing that minimum
contacts and purposeful availment are simply a "reincarnation of the old implied consent
fiction.")
205 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 ( 1980).
206 /d. at 300; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220-29 (I 977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority should not have reached the minimum contacts question,
but if such analysis is necessary, then finding minimum contacts met for a corporation
chartered under Delaware law).
207
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). There, the Court found
that defendants, businessmen who entered into a franchise agreement with Burger King, a
Florida corporation, had acted with purpose in the forum state. Id. at 479-82. In such a case,
only upon a strong showing that the forum was an unreasonable one would a defendant be able
to avoid that court's jurisdiction. /d. at 482-83, 486-87. In dicta, Justice Brennan suggested
199
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Wide dissent stated in passing that the defendants had contact with the
08
forum? But most of his dissent focused on modem commerce and on the
minimal burden on the defendants. For him, a court had to balance all of the
various factors identified in McGee. 209
The Court did not always adhere to the majority' s insistence that
contacts had to come about through the defendant's activity purposefully
directed at the forum, as insisted upon in Justice White's majority opinion in
World-Wide. For example, in an opinion that at best can be described as
opaque, Calder v. Jones stated in broad terms that a writer and editor for the
National Inquirer were subject to jurisdiction in California because they
210
knew that their conduct would have an effect in the forum state.
Other
parts of the opinion insisted that the defendants targeted the forum state. 211
Without explanation, the unanimous opinion cited World-Wide as support
for its discussion of the "effects" felt in the forum state. 212
World-Wide signaled a narrower view of personal jurisdiction than the
view of many lower courts213 and Justice Brennan? 4 Even without an
explanation for the necessity of contacts with the forum, World-Wide was in
place. A court could not merely ask whether the assertion of jurisdiction was
too burdensome to deprive a defendant of an opportuni~ to defend;215 it had
to find some threshold of contacts with the forum state. 16 And as discussed
above, taking the requirement of purposeful activity directed at the forum as
the necessary minimum could significantly limit the jurisdictional reach of
state courts. 21 7
Not surprisingly, World-Wide created uncertainty for lower courts? 18 In
a passing reference to Gray, Justice White seemingly approved its result. 219
The facts before the Court were distinguishable because the stream of
that upon a lower showing of minimum contacts, i.e., not purposeful activity, jurisdiction
might be proper when the fairness factors weighed heavily in favor the forum.Jd. at 485-86.
208
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209
Jd. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
211
ld. at789.
212 Jd.

°

213
Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A
Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 264-73 (1989) (detailing the limiting
effect World-Wide had on lower courts' stream of commerce analysis as opposed to the
expansive analysis followed after Gray).
214
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J. , dissenting).
215
216
21 7
218

!d. at 294 (majority opinion).
ld.

See supra pp. 230-232.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. , 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987)
(O'Connor, J, concurring).
219
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298.
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commerce ended in New York when the ultimate consumer purchased the
vehicle. But applied literally, the Court's test suggested that in a case like
Gray, a component-parts manufacturer like Titan Valve was not subject to
jurisdiction because it did not ship its product to or direct other purposeful
activity to the forum state.
As a result of the division among lower courts, the Court granted
certiorari to resolve that issue in Asahi Metal Industry Co. , Ltd. v. Superior
220
Court of California. There, the plaintiff and his wife were involved in an
accident when the tire on his motorcycle deflated. 221 The plaintiff was
222
injured and his wife died.
He sued a Taiwanese company that
223
manufactured the tire.
The Taiwanese company filed a third party
complaint against Asahi, thought to be the manufacturer of the valve stem.224
The original plaintiff settled his case.225 The jurisdictional issue arose
between the original defendant and the third-party defendant.226
The Court was unanimous in finding that California could not assert
jurisdiction over Asahi.227 Ei~ht Justices agreed that the assertion of
jurisdiction was unreasonable? 8 They focused on the lack of any interest
that California had in the litigation, the lack of any special need that the
original defendant had in having the dispute resolved in California, and on
the significant burden on Asahi in defending the case in California. 229
However, eight Justices believed that the threshold question was the
230
Justice Stevens concurred in the
sufficiency of contacts with the forum.
result and believed that the case should be resolved by reference only to the
. 23 1
reasona bleness anaIys1s.
Because the remaining eight Justices were equally divided on the
sufficiency of the contacts, Justice Stevens, no doubt pressured by his fellow
Justices, addressed the sufficiency of the contacts? 32 Justice O'Connor,
writing for four Justices, held that contacts that come about through
operation of the stream of commerce without more are insufficient to satisfy

220
221

222
223
224

225
226
227
228
229
230
231

232

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108 (majority opinion).
!d.
/d. at 106.
!d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at I05.
/d. at 114 (majority opinion).
!d. at 114-15.
/d. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
!d. at 121 (Stevens, J. , concurring).
!d. at 122.
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the contacts part of the Court's test. 233 Awareness that the product would end
up in the forum was not enough.234 Here was Hanson coming back to
roost. 235 Justice Brennan, also writing for four Justices, found the contacts
sufficient and would so hold as loDf as the product arrived in the forum state
through the stream of commerce. 23
Justice Stevens would have found that the contacts in the case before
the Court were sufficient.237 While more tentative than Justice Brennan, he
stated that in the case before the Court, the contacts were sufficient in light
of the volume, value and hazard of the product placed in the stream of
commerce. 238
Asahi seemed to resolve little. Although some lower courts relied on
Justice O' Connor's opinion,239 ignoring the fact that her contacts analysis
had only four votes, one could hardly state with much confidence what the
law was. Five Justices endorsed the view that on the facts of the case before
the Court, the contacts would have been sufficient.240 But line drawing based
on Justice Stevens' opinion was speculative at best.
As bad as was the Court's division in Asahi it got worse in the Court's
last foray into personal jurisdiction between 1990 and 2010. Burnham v.
Superior Court of California was, according to all nine Justices, an
extremely easy case. 241 Dennis Burnham's family moved to California,
leaving him residing in New Jersey. 242 After a three-day visit to California,
as he returned one of his children to his wife's home, Burnham was served
in hand with a court summons and divorce petition.243 At issue was the
continued vitality of what remained of Pennoyer: was in-hand, in-state
service of process sufficient to satisfy due process? 244 Speaking for four
233
234

Jd. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
ld.

235

/d. at 109. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfY the
requirement of contact with the forum State . .. . (I]t is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduc ti ng
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.").
236
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (1 987) (Brenna n, J., concurring).
237
/d. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
238
/d.
239

Levi McAllister, Comment, Paddling the Stream of Commerce: The Supreme Court's
Need to Cautiously Re-Examine One Aspect of Personal Jurisdiction, and the Judicial and
Financial Consequences Resulting from Current Approaches, 3 HIGH CT. Q. REV. 53, 57-58
(2007) (citing cases from the First, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits utilizing O'Connor's test).
240
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
241
Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
242
!d. at 607.
243
ld. at 608 .
244
Jd. at 610.

2015]

Limiting Access to U.S. Courts

235

45

justices, Justice Scalia said yes? He did so based on tradition; in fact, his
opinion used the term "tradition" or "traditional" thirty-two times?46 Despite
the agreement that the result was easy, Justice Scalia spent considerable time
attacking the soundness of Justice Brennan's reasoning in his concurring
. .
"147
oplillon.
Also writing for four Justices, Justice Brennan, relying upon dicta from
Shaffer, insisted that all assertions of jurisdiction must satisfy due process. 248
He found that the defendant's contacts were sufficient to make the assertion
49
of jurisdiction reasonable? He left open whether one's contact with the
forum may be too transient to support jurisdiction even if the defendant was
50
served in hand?
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Asahi offered some limited
guidance to lower courts. His brief concurring opinion in Burnham offered
251
none at all.
Asahi and Burnham demonstrated the deep divisions within the Court.
In both cases, the Court squandered the opportunity to offer much guidance
to lower courts because of the split in the Court. Some have speculated with
good reason that the Court did not grant certiorari in a personal jurisdiction
case until Justice Stevens retired. 252

245

/d. at 607.
!d. at 604.
247
/d. at 622-28.
248
/d. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring).
249
/d. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
250
/d. at 638-39 (Brennan, J. , concurring).
251
/d. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cases that would force a court to resolve
differences between the different opinions in Burnham are unlikely to arise outside of law
school classrooms. For example, one can envision a case where a defendant's presence in-state
is so transient that Justice Brennan would have found that the assertion of jurisdiction v iolated
due process. Sources like case books cite one over-flight case where a defendant was served
when he was flying over the forum-state. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark.
1959). Such a case might have forced Justice White to decide whether a defendant not
intentionally in the forum state was subj ect to jurisdiction based only on transient presence.
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). But a look at cases citing Burnham
suggests that most cases of transient presence raised a different issue: was the defendant
voluntarily in the state when he was served? See, e.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 193 Ariz. 173
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a father was voluntarily in the state when visiting his son);
Santa Escolastica, Inc. v. Pavlovsky, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Ky. 20 10) (holding that an
Argentine citizen was properly served and subject to personal jurisdiction in Kentucky because
he was voluntarily in the state on business). Most law school hypotheticals in which a
defendant is in state briefly but voluntarily are unrealistic because a plaintiff is highly unlikely
to be able to anticipate the defendant's brief stay in state without inducing the defendant to
come into the state (and thereby, implicating the voluntariness question).
252
Citron, The Last Common Law Justice, supra note 4, at 469 ("Despite - or more
likely because of - his refusal to provide a fifth vote to any opinion in Asahi or Burnham, the
246
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General Jurisdiction

The Court also took a begrudging view of general jurisdiction during
the 1980s. Plaintiffs in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
were the representatives and survivors of four Americans who died in a
helicopter crash in Peru.253 They were emR!oyed by a Peruvian alter ego of
an American company based in Texas? 4 The employer contracted with
Helicopteros, a Colombian corporation, to rrovide transportation to the
Peruvian worksite where the crash occurred.2 5 Helicopteros' contacts with
Texas, where the plaintiffs brought suit, were limited but meaningful. 256 The
257
chief executive officer of the company negotiated the contract in Texas.
58
The company accepted payments drawn on a Texas bank.Z More
substantially, it sent personnel to Texas for training and, over a period
59
spanning several years, it made substantial purchases of equipment there.Z
The Court found that the contacts were not continuous and
60
systematic.Z The defendant did not maintain an office in Texas and it did
not apply for a license to do business there.261 In reliance on preInternational Shoe precedent, the Court observed that purchases and related
trips to the forum do not constitute sufficient contacts with the forum.Z 62
The opinion offered little guidance about where the line existed
between the kinds of contacts in Perkins where the Court upheld jurisdiction
and those in Helicopteros, where they were not. 263 But the Court did not
limit general jurisdiction only to a corporation's principal place of business
or state of incorporation?64 It denied jurisdiction on facts where many lower
courts would have granted jurisdiction.Z65 Undoubtedly, many lower courts

Supreme Court did not revisit the doctrinal disputes at issue in those cases until after Stevens
retired.").
253
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409- 10 ( 1984).
254 /d. at 410.
255
ld
256

!d. at411.
/d. at 410-11.
258 !d. at 411.
259 Jd
260
!d. at 4 16.
261
I d.
262 !d. at4 17.
263
Rhodes, supra note 54, at 816 ("Instead, there is a qualitative aspect to the analysis as
well, requiring that the defendant's forum contacts must be ' thought so substantial and of such
a nature' to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. But a question left unanswered by both
Perkins and Helicopteros is the type of forum activities that satisfy the qualitative aspect of
this analysis.").
264
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16.
265
George, supra note 147, at 11 12 ("[C]ourts have based the assertion of general
257
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would have been influenced by the plaintiffs' need for a finding that Texas
was a proper forum for suit because it was the only plausible venue within
the United States? 66 The alternative was to file the action in a foreign
country, which almost certainly would provide less favorable law and where
67
fact-finders might not have been sympathetic to foreign nationals?
One problem with the Court's general jurisdiction case law was the lack
of an explanation of the underlying theory making general jurisdiction
appropriate. As in Perkins, the Court was silent on the underlying theory for
68
why general jurisdiction was appropriate? The Court might have explained
Perkins as a case of jurisdiction by necessity; if suit were not proper in Ohio,
269
the plaintiff would have had no practical venue in which to bring suit. But
in neither Perkins nor Helicopteros did the Court attempt to explain Perkins
270
on such a narrow ground. As such, general jurisdiction would be a limited
safety valve. But the Court has had opportunities to limit Perkins to its facts
but has never done so. In addition, the Court did not discuss the relative
271
convenience or burdens faced by the parties. In both cases, the Court has

jurisdiction on a history of regular business activities. An Illinois court in Huffman v. Inland
Oil & Transport Co. considered the availability of jurisdiction in a suit brought by a Missouri
resident against a Missouri corporation involving an injury that occurred in Alabama.
Jurisdiction was found based on evidence that the defendant had regularly sailed its vessels on
Illinois waters for a six-month period.").
266
Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 913, 916 (1985) ("Among the facts that should have had bearing was that the
alternative forum for the Helicopteros plaintiffs would not have been some other state. Helical
was amenable to suit in no state if not in Texas; the alternative would have been a foreign
country.").
267 /d. at 933-34 (Discussing the difficulties presented by trying a tort case in a foreign
country like Peru, including a lack of sympathy for claims of actual damages similar to those a
tort plaintiff would claim in the United States, damages being awarded in local currencies, the
unavailability of contingency fee arrangements, and the possibility of being required to pay the
winning party's attorney's fees).
268
1/elicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952). See also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 6 10,
641 ( 1988) ("As in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court's general
jurisdiction analysis consisted of a catalogue of the defendant's contacts with the forum, which
culminated in a finding that they were insufficient to support general jurisdiction. The Court's
rationale offered no new insight into general jutisdiction theory or the range of contacts that
might support general jurisdiction. Instead, it merely found that Helical's commercial contacts
with the forum- although arguably 'continuous,' 'systematic,' and 'substantial' - could not
support general jurisdiction.").
269 Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. See also, Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Patrick J. Borchers, The
Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 124 (2001) ("[T]he lack of
any alternative forum might make Perkins a case of jurisdiction by necessity, rather than a
clear example of contacts-based general jurisdiction.").
270 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
271
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
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focused on the continuous and systematic nature of the defendants' contacts
with the forum: in Perkins they were substantial, 272 in Helicopteros they
were not. 273 Left open was whether contacts alone - or contacts p1us th e
additional fairness factors that develofed in specific jurisdiction cases applied to general jurisdiction analysis. 74
275
Scholars have debated various rationales for general jurisdiction. But
even among scholars, no theory has emerged as a coherent explanation for
general jurisdiction. 276 For example, Professor Twitchell identified the
origins of general jurisdiction in history when jurisdiction was based on
sovereign power, consent or allegiance?77 At that time, courts did not
consider the relationship of the suit to the defendant's cond"E.ct in the
forum. 278 Thus, in the pre-International Shoe era, general jurisdiction may
have been an important doctrine to assure a plaintiff a forum against a
corporation in a jurisdiction other than the corporation's state of
incorporation.279 But with the expansion of specific jurisdiction in the
modern era, according to Professor Twitchell, the need for general
jurisdiction has diminished. 280 She argued that it should be reserved for "its
most essential function: providing one forum where a defendant may always
be sued."28 1 Twitchell argued in favor of retention of general jurisdiction
even with the modern expansion of specific jurisdiction. But she urged a
272

Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19.
274
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765-66 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
("As the majority points out, all of the cases in which we have applied the reasonableness
prong have involved specific as opposed to general jurisdiction. Whether the reasonableness
prong should apply in the general jurisdiction context is therefore a question we have never
decided, and it is one on which I can appreciate the arguments on both sides.").
275
See generally Michael H. HofTheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing general
jurisdiction as providing a gap filling function); Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note
46 (identifying four justifications for general jurisdiction; convenience for the defendant,
convenience for the plaintiff, to ensure the power of states, and the quid pro quo theory of
general jurisdiction); Cornett & HofTheimer, supra note 9 (arguing that general jurisdiction
gives traditional power to the states to require non-resident corporations to appear in their
courts); Twitchell, supra note 268 (arguing that general jurisdiction should be limited to its
essential function of ensuring that there is at least one location where a defendant can be sued).
276
Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 999, 1012 (2012) ("The Court rarely has addressed the particular policies underlying
general jurisdiction, and this silence has caused academic commentators and courts to propose
various theories and applications of general jurisdiction.").
277
Twitchell, supra note 268, at 614.
278
!d. at 621.
2
~ /d. at622,669.
280
!d. at 622-30.
281
!d. at 667.
273
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much narrower view of its availability, basicall~ to where it had its principal
place of business or state of incorporation. 82 Her test would provide
283
. b.l.
pred tcta
1 1ty.
Professor Lea Brilmayer identified four justifications for general
jurisdiction.Z 84 The first was convenience for the defendant.285 The rationale
parallels the Court's holding that a natural person's state of residence is a
proper forum. 286 A second justification is convenience to the plaintiff.287
Third is, on the basis of gower, a state must be able to "compel the
2
appearance of defendants"
in order to adjudicate the rights of a party.
This essentially equates to the state border concept of Pennoyer. 289 Critical
of the first three justifications, Professor Brilmayer found the "most
satisfactory basis" for general jurisdiction to be the quid pro quo theory
between a state and its domiciliaries.290 Having sufficient contacts with the
forum state gives the defendant a stake in the political process: "the basic
inquiry must be whether the defendant's level of activity rises to the level of
activity of an insider, so that relegating the defendant to the political
processes is fair."291 Although she wrote about general jurisdiction long
before recent Court cases extending the right of corporations to give political
contributions,292 her theory would seemingly have increasing relevance
today. That would be so even though a corporation cannot vote. In addition
to a corporation's power to influence politics through monetary
contributions, the numerous employees living in the forum state vote and,
presumably, represent the interests of their employer. 293

282

!d. at 668-71.
/d. at 669.
284 Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note 46, at 730.
285 ld.
286 !d.
287 ld. at 730-31.
288 /d. at 73 1.
289 Jd. at 73 1-32.
290 /d. at 732-33.
291 /d. at 742.
292 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed.
Election Comm ' n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
293 See Brendan Fischer, On NFIB Conference Call, Romney Urges Employers to Tell
Employees How to Vote, Just Like the Kochs , COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www .commondreams.org/view/20 12/ 10118-5 (Presidential candidate Mitt Romney
encouraged business owners to tell their employees how to vote: " I hope you make it very
clear to your employees what you believe is in the best interest of your enterprise and therefore
their job and their future in the upcoming elections. And whether you agree with me or you
agree with President Obama, or whatever your political view, I hope - 1 hope you pass those
along to your employees. Nothing illegal about you talking to your employees about what you
believe is best for the business, because I think that will figure into their election decision,
283
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Professor Brilmayer's approach would be more consonant with more
94
liberal theories of general jurisdiction? For example, the presence of many
Walmart stores in a state would provide Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with political
clout and should therefore justify the assertion of jurisdiction even in cases
unrelated to the forum contacts. 295 Limiting general jurisdiction to the state
of incorporation and principal place of business creates greater certainty but
ignores the fact that a corporation may gain extraordinary benefits from the
forum state even if that is not its principal place ofbusiness?96
Many lower courts adopted broad interpretations of general
jurisdiction. 297 They often have done so to provide the plaintiff, often a state
resident, a convenient place to sue. Some courts, for example, have held that
general jurisdiction was proper only upon a showing of systematic and
continuous contacts with the forum, allowing suit, for example, against large
corporations in almost any state in the United States?98 That view often
allows creative forum-shopping to assure favorable law applies to the

their voting decision and of course doing that with your family and your kids as well. ").
294
Roy L. Brooks, The Essential Purpose and Analytical Structure of Personal
Jurisdiction Law, 27 IND. L. REv. 361, 375 (1993). Others are comfortable with a
more liberal appli cation of the doctrine. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444 ( 1988) (positing that general jurisdiction exists for
companies and corporations that have a large presence in a state).
295 Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note 46, at 742 (indicating that the systematic
activity of a defendant within a forum, "such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business,
suggests that the person or corporate entity is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be
relegated to the State's political process.").
296
In the 20 13 fiscal year, Walmart U.S. net sales reached $274.5 billion. Walmart 2013
Annual Report 5, http://c46b2bcc0db5865f5a76-91 c2ff8eba65983al c33d367b8503d02.r78.cf2
.rackcdn.corn/88/2dl 4fdf67184a359fdef07b Ic3f4732/20 13-annual-report-for-walmart-storesinc_ 130221024708579502.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). Walmart operated 4005 Walmart
stores in the United States in fiscal 2013, with 217 of those stores in Califomia./d. at 59. The
estimated average net sales per store was $70 million and the net sales in California alone is
estimated at $ 15,190,000. Jd. at 5, 59.
297
Rhodes, supra note 54, at 830-55 (detailing some of the many approaches lower courts
have taken to general jurisdiction including the Ipse Dixit approach, precedential comparisons,
factor analysis, central business activities, and quid pro quo).
298
ld. at 830 nn.l l 8-2 1 (Citing cases in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Texas where
the courts simply concluded there was jurisdiction based on a limited showing of continuous
and systematic contacts); see, e.g. , Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512
So. 2d 1334, 1334-36 (Ala. 1987) (holding that nonresident corporation 's repeated wholesale
auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama, including the automobile at issue in the
underlying lawsuit, was purposefully directed forum activity that constituted a "'continuous
and systematic ' course of conduct in Alabama" supporting jurisdiction); Waters v. Deutz
Corp., 479 A.2d 273,274-76 (Del. 1984) (holding German corporation was "doing business"
in Delaware by shipping its manufactured tractors, including the tractor injuring the Delaware
plaintiff, through its wholly owned American subsidiary into Delaware).
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plaintiffs suit. 299 And while courts may be influenced in how broadly they
read general jurisdiction precedent by their views of forum-shopping, 300
little in the theoretical underpinnings of general jurisdiction explains why a
plaintiffs successful forum-shopping is relevant to the breadth of general
jurisdiction.
C. Summary of the 1980s

The 1980s did more than demonstrate deep divisions within the
Court. 301 In some instances, like Calder v. Jones, the Court upheld
jurisdiction. 302 But some ominous themes emerged.
Despite upholding jurisdiction in Burnham, the conservatives on the
Court demonstrated a desire to limit jurisdiction in other cases.303 The notion
that jurisdiction turned on convenience was at risk. Instead, in reliance on
Hanson , the conservative wing of the Court was trying to develop a narrow
304
theory of jurisdiction.
Entering the 1980s, one could have argued that McGee's due process

299
Even though the defendant did not raise a personal jurisdictional challenge, the facts of
Ferens v. John Deere suggest the forum-shopping potential of the liberal view of general
jurisdiction. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). There, the plaintiff was injured
when he was using a John Deere combine in Pennsylvania where he lived. Id. at 519. He
waited to contact a lawyer until after the statute of limitations had run on his tort claim. Court
Reinstates Suit of Pa. Farmer, Observer-Reporter (Washington, Pa.), Mar 6, 1990 at A-5 . To
revive the tort claim, the plaintiff's lawyer filed the action in Mississippi. Ferens, 494 U.S. at
519. Under Mississippi conflict of law rules, its longer statute of limitations applied to the
plaintiff's tort claim. !d. at 519-20. The issue before the Court in Ferens was whether, when
the plaintiff sought a transfer of venue to Pennsylvania, Mississippi's choice of law rules
traveled with the suit. !d. at 520. The Court held that they did.ld. at 532.
300
See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 609. ("The consensus of the Supreme Court in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires conceals important areas of divergence with immediate practical
consequences. On the one hand, the opinion can be read narrowly as affirming the exclusive
classification of cases into specific and general jurisdiction and disallowing general
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers based solely on sporadic sales through intermediaries.
On the other hand, it can be read broadly as effectively ending general jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations by restricting general jurisdiction to corporations that incorporate
under the laws of the state, maintain their principal place of business in the state, or have such
a comparably close connection with the state so that they are 'at home' in the state.").
301
See discussion supra Part III.b.
302
See supra text accompanying note 211.
303
See supra pp. 14- 15.
304
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, the Court
found that the contacts part of the due process analysis was related to interstate federalism. !d.
at 292. While it attempted to distance it.~clf from the "shibboleth" of Pennoyer (the idea that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected states' rights), the concept that state borders still matter
is rooted in Pennoyer's reliance on principles of international law. See id. at 293-94; see also
Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,729-30 (1878).
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analysis was the dominant theme. At that time, procedural due process
meant that a defendant could be hauled into court as long as the forum
provided the defendant with adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 305 Consistent with McGee, a court needed to determine the extent of
the burden on the defendant in light of other competing needs, including
those of the plaintiff. 306 The ease of travel and communications made state
borders less important in a modem society. 307 As argued above, that is a
coherent theory of the relevance of due process to the jurisdictional
. 308
ana 1ys1s.
But Pennoyer's questionable theo~ of federalism still lurked in the
Supreme Court at the end of the 1980s. 3 That is, state borders still mattered
- even thou~h the Court failed to offer a compelling explanation for why
that was so. 1 Further, Hanson's flawed analysis was now front and
center? " A result-oriented decision, motivated by an understandable desire
to avoid a gross injustice, now reemerged as important precedent. 312 Lost in
its reemergence were the facts that it was not only result-oriented but it was
also decided by a slim majority.313 Further, the Court now cited its approach
to the contacts part of the due process test as a threshold question to the
assessment of reasonableness, despite the fact that Hanson did not engage in
such a two-step analpis. 314 The Court ignored ways in which Hanson could
have been narrowed. 15
Finally, although it occurred in the 1970s and not the 1980s, the Court' s
new in rem jurisprudence - conflating in rem and in personam due process
analysis - would have unexpected ramifications in the future. 316 At the

°

305
306
307
308

See discussion supra Part II.d.
See supra p. 217.
!d.
Jd.

309

See supra pp. 231 .

310

/d.

311

The Court could have focused on Hanson's conclusion that the defendant's contacts
with Florida were unrelated to the claim. ft might have emphasized the unusual nature of the
facts, suggesting that Hanson should not be the major premise of due process analysis, but
instead, that McGee should have. Instead, World-Wide was a full-throated endorsement of a
broad reading of Hanson. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,294 (1980).
312
See supra pp. 21 9-222.
313
See generally World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286 (omitting any discussion of the flaws in
Hanson).
314
See generally Hanson v. Denck1a, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (finding no contacts despite
continued payments and correspondence between the decedent and the Delaware trust
company, the Court did not analyze the reasonableness of allowing jurisdiction).
315
See generally World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286 {applying Hanson without discussion of
limiting it to its facts because it was a result-oriented decision).
316
See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (applying the International Shoe
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time, Helicopteros' implications may not have been obvious. On its face, the
decision indicated that purchases, even if substantial, did not amount to
continuous and systematic contacts that could justify an assertion of general
jurisdiction. 317 But as Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer have argued,
narrowing in rem jurisdiction made more important the use of general
jurisdiction. 318 Thus, prior to Shaffer, plaintiffs could have commenced suit
by attaching property even if it had no relationship to the underlying
dispute. 319 After Shaffer, plaintiffs gained little by attaching property without satisfying International Shoe, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction
violated due process. In such cases, plaintiffs might need to rely on general
jurisdiction; but retrenchment in general jurisdiction meant that those
plaintiffs would no longer be able to file suit in a plaintiff-friendly venue.
Again, as Professor Hoffheimer has pointed out, as Shaffer's author, Justice
Marshall would no doubt be surprised at the effect of the Court's decision. 320
But the full effects of Shaffer are coming into focus only now. That is part of
the rest of the story. 321

IV. THE REEMERGENCE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Modern Developments
Between 1990 and 2010, a lot changed in the world. The Internet
created a globalized market and made information available around the

minimum contacts test to in rem cases as well as in personam cases).
317
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 41 7 (1984).
318
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("After in rem actions became
subordinated to due process limits governing actions in personam, courts began to address
substantive limits on general jurisdiction irrespective of the fo rm of litigation. The Court held
in Shaffer v. Heitner that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated due process in the absence of
minimum contacts. Justice Marshall required broadly that 'all assertions of state court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.' But no one at that time thought general jurisdiction was limited to a corporation's
base of operations, and Justice Marshall would have been astonished to learn that his words
would one day have the effect of eliminating state power over large corporations active in
states where they were routinely required to answer lawsuits in 1977." (quoting Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 212)).
319
See supra pp. 224.
320
Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 549 ("This holding did not alter the reach of in rem
jurisdiction when the legal claims related to attached property, but it meant that so-called quasi
in rem jurisdiction was no longer permissible when the defendant had no ties in the state and
when the claims in litigation were unrelated to the property that had been seized to secure
jurisdiction. In other words, Shaffer restricted the permissible scope of quasi in rem
jurisdiction to the scope of specific jurisdiction.").
321
See infra text accompanying note 606.
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world in an instant. 322 Trade agreements opened borders around the world,
making international transactions increasingly common. 323
Without
Supreme Court guidance, lower courts had to make do with the Court's
earlier divided precedent. 324
Many courts have addressed, with differing results, the way in which
contacts analysis works in Internet cases. 325 Lower courts faced cases where
326
defendants caused harm by circulating false information over the Internet,
322
See, e.g., J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,2791 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many
of which are not anticipated by our precedents. "); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (calling the Internet and its impact on commerce "perhaps the latest
and greatest .. . historical, globe-shrinking trend"); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.O. Pa. 1997) (stating that the Internet "makes it possible to
conduct business throughout the world entirely from a desktop").
323
Veronica Hernandez, Comment, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780 (2011): Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 44 U. TOL. L. REV.
431, 433 (noting that " the globalization of commerce over the past 50 years presents a
dramatic shift in American society" and that "the abandonment of a manufacturing-based
economy in the late twentieth century has resulted in the explosive growth in foreign goods,
which necessitates ... enabl[ing] states to provide redress to their citizens for injuries caused
by defective goods manufactured abroad"); see also THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LITIGATING
INTERNATIONAL TORTS [N U.S. COURTS § I: I (2013) ("As the world 's economy becomes
more integrated, products and services move with increasing frequency across national borders
.. . American courts and lawyers wrestle with .. .[p]roviding redress when foreign products
cause harm in the U.S."). These changes came at the same time as tort reform and other
changes like statutes of repose that made choice of forum more crucial than ever. See HENRY
COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32560, SELECTED PRODUCTS LIABILITY ISSUES: A
FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 20-23 (2005), available at https ://stuff.mit.edulafs/sipb.mit.edulcontrib/
wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL32560.pdf (listing statutes of repose in all fifty state);
see also The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States, Congress of the United States
Congressional Budget Office, (June 2004), available at http ://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/report_2.pdf (discussing the prevalence of tort reform since the mid-1980s ).
324
See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (establishing the "sliding scale" Internet
jurisdiction test that considers the level of interactivity or passivity of a defendant's website
rather than purposeful availment); CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257 (holding that the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, despite
never having traveled there, by creating an ongoing marketing relationship with the plaintiff
corporation headquartered in the forum); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc ., 130 F.3d 4 14 (9th
Cir. 1997) (surveying approaches adopted by other courts, including the Zippo test, as well as
tests that examine the number of "hits" a website receives and other evidence that the Internet
activity was directed at the forum state).
325
See Patrick J. Borchers, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2011) (noting that lower courts
have "divided sharply" regarding personal jurisdiction in Internet cases).
326
See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 3 17 F.3d 467,471 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an allegedly
defamatory article about the plaintiff posted online by the defendant did not constitute a
substantial enough contact to establish personal jurisdiction, since the article targeted the
plaintiff and not the forum).
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engaging in deceptive business practices, or violating the intellectual
property rights of in-state citizens from remote locations. 327 In response,
many courts extended their state' s jurisdictional reach.328 Often, they
ignored the teachings of cases like World-Wide and Hanson that required a
demonstration of purposeful activity directed at the forum. 329 Instead, they
relied on Calder, which required knowledge that the harm would take place
in the forum. 330
After Asahi, courts continued to struggle with the anal~sis when a
product was swept into the forum via the stream of commerce. 31 But many
courts relied on the stream of commerce theory to extend jurisdiction. 332
They did so by applying some mix of Justice Brennan's liberal test and
Justice Stevens' narrower test in Asahi or by relying on dicta from WorldWide in which Justice White cited Gray with approval. 333 Again, that
seemed consonant with the two themes developed above: modem commerce
has increased instances in which out-of-state companies may create in-state
harm, and a court can uphold jurisdiction as long as the defendant has a
34
reasonable opportunity to be heard? That is, due process is not offended if
the burden on the defendant is not ovetwhelming. 33

327 See, e.g., Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 137 P.3d 706 (Utah 2006) (adopting a
version of the Zippo "sliding scale" test, but holding that a single unsolicited e-mail
advertisement sent to the forum state by the defendant was not a significant enough contact to
render jurisdiction proper); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that defendant's mere creation of a website in another state, although viewable
in the forum state, did not render defendant amenable to suit in the forum state for allegedly
infringing on plaintiff's trademark).
328 See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)
(exercising jurisdiction over a defendant whose website could have been viewed in the forum
state, whether or not it actually was).
329 See, e.g., Yerizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d. 601,618-19 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (finding jurisdiction proper where defendants allegedly sent millions of e-mails
through plaintiff's servers in the forum state, even though defendants did not know where
plaintiff's servers were located. "By allegedly transmitting millions of e-mails to make money
at Yerizon's expense, knowing or reasonably knowing that such conduct would harm
Yerizon's e-mail servers, Defendants should have expected to get dragged into court where
their actions caused the greatest injury.").
330 Jd at 614 ("In tort cases involving Web sites, some courts have ... applied the 'effects
test' set forth in Calder.").
331 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (acknowledging
that lower courts were struggling with "decades-old questions left open in Asahi.").
332 See Hernandez, s upra note 323, at 438 ("The deep split and narrow holding in Asahi
left state courts great latitude in finding minimum contacts through the stream-of-commerce
theory when analyzing the contacts prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen test.").
333 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
334 See supra pp. 217-218, 242.
335 See supra pp. 217-218.
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General jurisdiction remained an available option as well. Many courts
took a liberal view of general jurisdiction? 36 For example, the Ninth Circuit
found that jurisdiction over L.L. Bean was proper, despite the absence of any
physical assets in the forum. state. 337 Again, while not all courts joined the
trend, many courts continued the trend towards extending the jurisdictional
reach of their courts. But as with the trend towards liberalization culminating
in the 1970s, the Court seems to be in the process of a second retrenchment.

B. The Recent Cases: A Quick Overview
With Justice Stevens' retirement, the Court quickly granted certiorari in
two personal jurisdiction cases. 338 Three years later, the Court again granted
the writ in two more personal jurisdiction cases. 339 This section provides an
overview of those decisions.
1.

Easy Cases Make Bad Law: General Jurisdiction
1.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown

The parents of two boys who died in a bus accident near Paris sued
Goodyear USA and three foreign subsidiaries in state court in North
340
Carolina.
Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina, did not
41
contest the court's jurisdiction but the three foreign companies did?
The state court of appeals recognized that the claim did not arise out of
any contact with the forum because the accident took place in France and the
tire that caused the wreck was manufactured abroad. 342 But it found that
some tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries arrived in North

n 6 See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY C . PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 102 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing cases in which courts exercised
general jurisdiction based on limited contacts with the forum state).
337
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated en bane,
366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004).
338
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (201 1); J.
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 (20 II ). Justice Stevens had been
viewed as having prevented the Court from gathering a majority of votes previously. See. e.g.,
Citron, The Case of the Retired Justice, supra note 4, at 644 ("After [Justice Stevens] retired in
2010 and was replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court apparently saw an opportunity to
resolve the conflict ... Stevens could have determined the legal standard in Asahi by voting
with either Justice Brennan or Justice O'Connor.").
339
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 111 5 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014).
340
341
342

Goodyear, 13 1 S. Ct. at 2850.
/d.
/d. at 2851 (citing Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 57-58 (2009)).
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343

Carolina through the stream of commerce. The contacts that resulted were
344
sufficient to satisfy due process.
A unanimous Supreme Court
345
di sagreed.
As observed by the Court, it has seldom addressed general
346
jurisdiction. But it did little to elucidate its test in this case.347 The primary
fault of the lower court seemed to be the reliance on the stream of commerce
theory in a general jurisdiction case. As the Court put it, "The North
Carolina court's stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference
between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction."348 The primary
discussion was short, consisting of a description of its holdings in Perkins
and Helicopteros and the conclusion that the defendants' contacts with
North Carolina fell short of the line because, as in Helicopteros, they were
349
not continuous and systematic.
Had the Court ended there, the decision
would have presaged no radical change in the law. 350
But Justice Ginsberg went further. She quoted Professor Brilmayer's
view that general jurisdiction over a corporation is akin to finding domicile
for an individual - a place where the corporation is "fairly regarded as at
home."351 In a parenthetical, she indicated that the "paradigm" where a
corporation would be at home is in the state of incorporation or in the state
352
where it has its principal place of business.
In concluding, she observed
that the foreign subsidiaries "are in no sense at home in North Carolina."353
The insertion of "at home" into the opinion divided commentators? 54

343
344

!d. (citing Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50,57-58 (2009)).
!d.

345
/d. See also Hoffheimer, supra note 275 (discussing the Court's holding and its
potential implications).
l 46 G~odyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
347
Hoftheimer, supra note 275, at 55 1 (noting that Goodyear failed to achieve its goal of
providing guidance to lower courts, since "it can be read in radically different ways.").
348
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855.
349
!d. at 2856-57.
350 See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63
S.C. L. REV. 527, 527-28 (2012) (noting that Goodyear could have been easily resolved under
existing precedent, and that the Court did not need to go further).
351
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
352 !d. at 2854.
353 /d. at 2857.
354
See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 551-52 (observing that Goodyear can be
interpreted as "approv[ing] general jurisdiction in multiple states where a foreign corporation
has strong permanent connections," while "equally support[ing] a restrictive approach that
limits general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and the . . . Principal place of
business"); Stein, supra note 350, at 547 (arguing that general jurisdiction over a corporation
should not necessarily be limited to its principal place of business, but also in any jurisdiction
where it is sufficiently "invested" and has "insider status").
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355

Some saw the opinion as limiting general jurisdiction to those two venues.
Others pointed out that, had the Court intended to limit general jurisdiction
35
in that manner, it could have stated such a rule unequivocally. As stated,
those two venues were "paradiWOs," not exclusive places where general
jurisdiction would be permitted. 3 7
Justice Ginsburg made no effort to explain the theoretical
underpinnings of general jurisdiction. 358 Her analogy to domicile is
intriguing, but not particularly helpful. Pennoyer recognized domicile as a
basis of the assertion of jurisdiction. 359 At that time, the explanation would
have been that a person within the state's borders is within the court's
exclusive jurisdiction, just as was property. 360 Once the Court moved away
from formalism, the Court explained that a person 's domicile is a suitable
place for suit against the defendant because he or she derives benefits from
residing in the state.361 In Burnham, when the Court returned to the rule that
a non-resident is subject to jurisdiction in a state when served in hand, in
state, Justice Scalia relied on tradition as a sufficient justification for
adherence to the rule. 362 Even Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
indicated that, in an expanded International Shoe analysis, the historic rule
upholding in-hand service put a defendant on notice that he was subject to a
court's jurisdiction. 363
As a matter of tradition, state of incorporation was a proper place to sue
a corporation by analogy to dornicile. 364 The Court needed some place where
355 See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language
of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 969 (2012) (arguing that
Goodyear clarifies and limits general jurisdiction to where a defendant is "at home" only).
356
See Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 590-92.
357
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
358 Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 551 ("The opinion avoided dissension by omitting any
discussion of the theoretical bases of jurisdiction and by withholding any examples of
'substantial ' or 'systematic and continuous' activity.").
359 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878).
360
!d. at 722 ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over person
and property within its territory.").
361
Miliken v. Meyer, 31 I U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("The state which accords [one of its
citizens] privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties.").
362
Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) ("The short of the matter is
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of
the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
363 !d. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]ur common understanding now, fortified by a
century of judicial practice, is that jurisdiction is often a function of geography. The transient
rule is consistent with reasonable expectations and is entitled to a strong presumption that it
comports with due process.").
364
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36. See also FREER & PERDVE, supra note 336, at 125.
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suit was ~roper and the state of incorporation was a fixed place, like one's
domicile. 65 Later, when the Court shifted its focus to its benefits-burden
analysis, one could argue that a corporation willingly affiliates with a state in
which it incorporates. 366 Its board of directors makes a conscious choice
almost certainly with an eye towards tax and liability issues.367
" Principal place of business" has a shorter history. In some preInternational Shoe cases, courts found personal jurisdiction proper in states
where the corporation had its principal place ofbusiness. 368 But the case law
did not equate general jurisdiction with the principal place ofbusiness. 369
As indicated, an individual is subject to suit wherever she is domiciled
because she has accepted benefits and protections of the law of that state.370
She cannot complain that the suit did not arise out of any conduct in the
forum. By analogy, a corporation that does a substantial amount of business
in a particular state is certain!,y accepting benefits and protections of the state
1
where a suit might be filed. 3 Further, given a host of decisions supporting
372
jurisdiction based only on contacts, a corporation cannot claim surprise
when it is haled into court for conduct unrelated to forum conduct.373
365
Stein, supra note 350, at 547 ("(I]n the nineteenth century, [state of incorporation] was
the only place that a corporation could be sued in personam insofar as its corporate status as a
juridical person was only recognized in its state of incorporation.").
366
See Brilmayer eta!. , supra note 46, at 733-34 ("[T]he corporation intentionally chooses
to create a relationship with the state of incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that
state's substantive and procedural laws. Such a choice creates a unique relationship that
justifies general jurisdiction over the corporation."); Stein, supra note 350, at 547 ("An entity's
choice of incorporation in a particular state is entirely voluntary and involves continuing
responsibility to and regulatory governance by the state.").
367
See Cornett & Hoftheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 55) (noting that corporations
often negotiate valuable tax benefits and other concessions from states in exchange for doing
business there).
368
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,317 ( 1945) (citing Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir. 1930)).
369
!d. at 317-19.
370
!d. at 319. See also supra text accompanying note 53; Miliken v. Meyer, 3 11 U.S. 457,
463 ( 1940) ("The state which accords [one of its citizens] privileges and affords protection to
him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties."); Brilmayer et
al., supra note 46, at 732 ("Domicile creates a unique relationship between the domiciliary and
the forum state, a relationship composed of the benefits provided to the domiciliary and the
burdens imposed by the state in consideration for those benefits.").
37 1
See Brilmayer et al. , supra note 46, at 741 ("[T)he reciprocal benefits rationale obtains
when the defendant carries out substantial activities, which implicate the police powers and
public facilities of the state.").
372
See Rhodes, supra note 54 (reviewing case law concerning jurisdiction based on
defendants' contacts with the forum).
373
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,3 11 , n.l8 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), for a similar argument in Justice Brennan's dissent when he
countered Justice White's argument that a defendant could not foresee being haled into court
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Many lower courts did not pick up on a change in the rules governing
general jurisdiction if the Court intended to make such a change. As two
374
scholars found, courts were back to business as usual after Goodyear.
The reasons may be obvious; many courts favor a long jurisdictional reach
to protect injured ~laintiffs . But the Court was about to narrow general
jurisdiction further. 75
ii.

Daimler AG v. Bauman

In 2004, twenty-three citizens of South American countries sued
Daimler AG in a federal district court in California? 76 The complaint alleged
that Daimler collaborated with the military dictatorship in Argentina
between 1976 and 1983 during the "Dirty War."377 Specifically, the
complaint alleged that the defendant was responsible for killing, torturing,
378
and kidnapping the plaintiffs and members of their families.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 379 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant' s contacts with
California were sufficient because of the extensive contacts of its subsidiary,
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), which is inco~orated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. 3 0 MBUSA distributes the
defendant's vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the United
States. 381
The district court franted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 38 After initially affirming the district court, the Ninth
Circuit reconsidered its decision and reversed?113 It concluded that MBUSA

unless the defendant directed purposeful activity toward the forum-state. The majority's
argument was entirely circular because a party cannot foresee where it will have to answer a
suit until the Supreme Court has resolved the question.
374 See, e.g., J.B. ex rei. Benjamin v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 12-cv-385, 2013 WL 452807,
at 3 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding that the Court in Goodyear "did not replace or redefine the wellestablished standard for establishing general jurisdiction"); see also Camilla Cohen, Comment,
Goodyear Dunlop 's Failed Attempt to Refine the Scope of General Jurisdiction, 65 FLA. L.
R EV. 1405, 1414-15 (2013); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3 n.14)
(noting that "leading treatises assumed the Jaw remained well settled even after [Goodyear]").
375
See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii.B. See also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9
(manuscript at 4).
376
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (20 14).
371
ld. at 750-51.
378
!d. at 751.
379
ld. at 75 1-52.
380
!d. at 752.
38 1
Id.
382
!d.
383
/d. at 753
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was the defendant' s agent and attributed its forum contacts to the
384
defendant. The Ninth Circuit did not address Goodyear.385
86
The Supreme Court reversed? The Court had at its disposal relatively
narrow approaches that it could have used to decide the case before it. Apart
387
from forum non-conveniens analysis, the Court could have found simply
that MBUSA's contacts were not attributable to the defendant and that the
388
remaining contacts were insufficient.
It could also have ~oncluded that,
even if the contacts were continuous and systematic, the assertion of
89
jurisdiction was otherwise unreasonable? Instead, the Court went further.
Justice Ginsburg made several observations, suggesting other possible
arguments that may surface in the future. For example, she observed that the
defendant "failed to object to plaintiffs' assertion that the California courts
could exercise all-purpose jurisdiction over MBUSA."390 She also found that
the Court did not have to decide on the standard to be used when a ~ laintiff
seeks to impute contacts of a subsidiary to its parent corporation. 3 1 Thus,
the Court did not reach the defendant' s argument that the subsidiary' s
contacts were to be imputed to the parent company "onll when the former is
so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego." 39 Instead, the Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit' s view because "[t]he Ninth Circuit's agency
finding rested primarily on its observation that MBUSA' s services were
' important' to [the defendant], as gauged by [the defendant's] hypothetical
readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist."393 That
394
proved too much.
The Court assumed that MBUSA was "at home" in California and that
384
385

Id at 753, 758-59.
Jd at 753.

386

/d. at 763 .
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v . Reyno, 454 U.S. 23 5, 247 (198 1); Cornett &
Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 62-63) (observing the lack of plaintiff ties to the
forum and the weak forum state interest in Daimler).
388 See Daimler, 134 S. C t. at 759-60 (declining to decide if the contacts of a subsidiary
would confer jurisdiction on the parent) .
389 Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The Court can and should decide this case on
the far simpler ground that, no matter how extensive Daimler' s contacts with California, that
State's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable given that the case involves foreign
plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign conduct . .. ").
J 90 Id. at 758 (majority opinion).
391 /d. at 760.
392 /d. at 759.
387

393
394

!d.

!d. at 7 59-60 ("The Ninth Circuit's agency theory thus appears to subject foreign
corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an
outcome that would sweep even beyond the 'sprawling view of general jurisdiction' we
rejected in Goodyear.").
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its contacts were "imputable to Daimler." 395 Even on the assumption that
MBUSA's contacts were imputable to the defendant, "Daimler's slim
396
The
contacts with the State hardly render it at home [in Californiaf
3 7
analysis focused on Goodyear's discussion of general jurisdiction.
While "Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its
principal place of business," Justice Ginsburg found that the plaintiffs'
alternative reading of general jurisdiction swept too broadly.398 According to
her, the plaintiffs' position would make a corporation subject to jurisdiction
"in every State in which [it] 'engages in a substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business. "'399 Such a formulation - despite the view of
many lower courts to the contrary - "is unacceptably grasping." 400
At that point in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg discussed an issue only
hinted at in Goodyear. Recognizing that a corporation could have such
extensive contacts with the forum to make it "at home" even if that state was
not its state of incorporation or principal place of business, Justice Ginsburg
401
found that was not plausible with regard to the defendant.
That was so
because even if a corporation had substantial connections with the forum,
"the same global reach would presumabli be available in every other State
in which MBUSA ' s sales are sizeable.'"'0 The explanation of that statement
was placed in a footnote where she dropped a bombshell: the general
jurisdiction inquiry does not "focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the
defendant's in-state contacts.'"' 03 Instead, a court must appraise a
corporation's activities in their entirety. Even if a corporation conducts
billions of dollars' worth of business in the forum, that does not render the
corporation "at home" in that state. 404
Justice Ginsburg, citing comity as a partial justification for the Court' s
holding, wrote "[o ]ther nations do not share the uninhibited approach to
05
personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.'"' The
395

ld. at 760.
I d.
397
ld. at 760-62.
398
Jd. at 760-61.
399 Id.
400
Id. at 761.
401
Id. at 761 -62.
402
Id. at 761.
403
I d. at 762, n.20. Commentators have criticized Justice Ginsburg's opinion for being too
zealous in protecting corporations from the "perceived evils of forum shopping," to the
detriment of injured individuals who will now have more difficulty bringing lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Cornett & Hoftheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5).
404
Daimler, I 34 S. Ct. at 762, n.20.
405
Id. at 763 . Of course, even were her statement universally true, one can ask why an
396
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Court observed that in the European Union, a corporate defendant generally
may be sued only where it is domiciled - unless the claim arises out of the
corporation's conduct in another location.406 The clear suggestion in
Daimler is that the Court is bringing U.S. law into conformity with the
prevailing European view.
But Justice Ginsburg's suggestion that Daimler was bringing United
States law in line with European law tells only part of the story. Regulations
promulgated under the European Union Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters407 provide that
an EU member state may normally exercise general jurisdiction over a
European corporation only in a forum in which the corporation is
dorniciled.408 Thus, one might argue that Justice Ginsburg is recognizing
409
"best practices" within the EU. But the convention and regulations do not
international norm should limit a state's constitutional power.
406
See id. ("In the European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in
the nation in which it is 'domiciled,' a tenn defined to refer only to the location of the
corporation 's 'statutory seat,' 'central administration,' or 'principal place of business."'). That
definition of "domicile" may parallel the new general jurisdiction rule: Daimler does not limit
general jurisdiction to the state of incorporation and principal place of business. Instead, it
suggests there may be a state in which the corporation is nonetheless at home beyond the state
of incorporation and state where it has its principal place of business. If one thinks about the
seemingly unrelated context where the Court has redefined "principal place of business," as
used in the diversity statute, the Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend used the "nerve center," the
state where high level administrative decisions are made, as the test for determining the
principal place of business. 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (20 10). In doing so, the Court recognized that
there may be some instances where the overwhelming majority of day-to-day activity took
place in a state other than where top level management decisions were made. Jd. at 96.
Potentially, that parallels domicile in the EU, since under the Brussels Regulation, domicile is
defined by the domestic laws of each country, making it possible for a defendant to be
domiciled in multiple countries. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 59(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
(EC).
407
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32. This Convention, also known as
the Brussels Convention, was largely superseded in 2001 by the Brussels Regulation with few
changes. Council Regulation 44/2001,2001 O.J. (L 12) I (EC) [hereinafter Brussels 1].
408
Brussels 1, supra note 407. An important exception to this general rule is that a
defendant corporation domiciled in the EU may be sued in a country where a co-defendant is
domiciled, so long as the two claims "are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings." Jd.
409
As developed below, even if following the Brussels I regulation on general jurisdiction
adheres to EU best practices, the Court may be putting plaintiffs suing in the United States at a
disadvantage because the Supreme Court, or at least a substantial wing of the Court, is not
committed to following the EU's liberal approach to specific jurisdiction. See infra notes 43744, 548-59, 566-69 and accompanying text; see also Brussels I, supra note 407, art. 5(3)
(permitting a defendant to be sued "where the harmful event occurred or may occur,"
regardless of domicile); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 60) (predicting
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govern when a plaintiff seeks to assert jurisdiction over a corporation that is
domiciled outside ofEurope.410
Some European countries take a narrow view when a plaintiff seeks to
assert jurisdiction over a non-European corporation on a claim that does not
arise out of forum contacts.411 But other member states take a much more
expansive approach. For example, German law allows the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant who owns property in Germany even if the
. unre1ated to the c1aim.
. 412
property IS
France, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have adopted
j urisdictional rules that allow their citizens to sue any non-European
defendant without regard to the defendant's contacts with the forum. 413
Obviously, plaintiffs securing judgments in such cases experience difficulty
when seeking enforcement outside the forum nation. 41 4 But as long as the
415
defendant has assets in the forum, plaintiffs can enforce their judgments.
In light of the different approaches to jurisdiction among European and
other trading partners, the Court's adoption of a restrictive interpretation of
the Due Process Clause does not seem to be the most efficacious approach to
international comity. Surely, comity would be advanced by an international
. en1orcement
~
compact regu1atmg
o f.JUdgments.41 6
that the Court will continue to reject any attempts by plaintiffs to expand specific jurisdiction).
410
See THOMAS 0. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 83 (Franklin A. Gevurtz,
ed., 2006).
411
See id. at 82 (discussing various approaches to personal jurisdiction in Europe; for
instance, Italian courts will not exercise personal jurisdiction over non-Europeans in contracts
cases if the contract was not formed in Italy).
412
FREER&PERDUE,sup ra note336,at 137.
413
MAIN, supra note 410, at 85.
414
FREER & PERDUE, s upra note 336, at 137.
415
3 LINDA SILBERMAN, LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 97:6, PROCEDURE FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT (20 15). While the Daimler Court seemed intent on
joining the perceived European trend towards narrowing general jurisdiction, the European
Court of Justice (EJC) may be expanding general jurisdiction, at least when the plaintiff is
bringing a privacy claim. In the ECJ's recent decision, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola
de Proteccion de Datos, the court held that Google, Inc., a California corporation, was subject
to suit in Spain, not for the violation of a Spanish Jaw, but for the violation of an EU directive
protecting against violations of privacy. Case C-1 3111 2, Google Spain SL v . Agencia Espanola
de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documentl
document.jsf?text=&docid= 152065&pagelndex=O&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=l&cid=69003. Although Google 's conduct took place outside of Spain, the ECJ found
that Google's Spanish subsidiary's marketing activities in Spain were attributable to Google.
!d.
416
The United States currently has no treaty or federal statute governing the enforcement
of judgments rendered in foreign countries; procedures fo r enforcing foreign judgments vary
by state. See DICKERSON, supra note 323, § 6.2 (discussing procedure for enforcing foreign
judgments); SILBERMAN, supra note 41 5 (detailing the various procedures of states for the
enforcement of a foreign judgments). Negotiations are currently underway regarding a possible
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iii. Genera/Implications for General Jurisdiction
As developed in more detail below in the discussion below,417 the
implications for foreign corporations who seek to avoid litigation in the
United States are significant. But even for a plaintiff suing a domestic
corporation and seeking a convenient forum in the United States, the
implications may be significant.
Think back to the example that I borrowed from Ferens v. John
Deere. 418 There, the plaintiff engaged in some creative forum shopping
made possible by our federal judicial system. John Deere did not challenge
personal jurisdiction. 419 Counsel for the defendant may have assumed that
jurisdiction would have been upheld because the defendant's contacts with
the forum state were so extensive. Alternatively, the jurisdiction might have
been based on consent; that is, in many states, domestic corporations must
appoint an agent for service of process in order to conduct business within
the state.420
Domestically, as long as legislatures keep in place such consent statutes
and as long as the Court upholds such slightly coerced consent, plaintiffs
may not lose their forum-shopping ability based on Goodyear and Daimler.
That could change if industry groups pressure legislatures to narrow their
consent statutes. In fact, some states already limit the scope of the
appointment of an agent for receiving service of process to cases arising out
of business conducted within the state.421 Thus, those states allow consent
only in specific jurisdiction cases. In states with narrower statutes, Goodyear
and Daimler will already have a significant impact.
Consider the John Deere example. If Mississippi lacked a broad consent
statute and the plaintiff relied on a general jurisdiction theory, the ,Elaintiff
would have to prove that John Deere was "at home" in Mississippi. 22 Prior
to Goodyear and Daimler, the plaintiff would have to prove that John Deere
had continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state (and perhaps

Hague Convention on the enforcement of judgments. 3 E. CHARLES ROUTH, LAws OF INT' L
TRADE§ 76:4, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMHITS: ARBITRATION AWARDS - UNDER
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (2015).
41 7
See discussion infra Part V .
418
See supra note 299.
419
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 5 16, 520 (1990).
420
See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
421

422

!d.

See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A . v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285 1 (20 11)
("A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations ... when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to
render them essentially at home in the forum State."). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 761 (2014)(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285 1 (2011)).
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that the assertion of jurisdiction was otherwise reasonable).423 John Deere's
substantial business activity in the state, including large number of
424
dealerships, would almost guarantee a finding of jurisdiction. Today, that
is no longer true.
The plaintiff would have to prove something more than John Deere's
Mississippi contacts. As Justice Ginsburg stated in Daimler, John Deere
would not necessarily be "at home" there. 425 The court would have to
examine John Deere's nationwide and worldwide contacts. With little
guidance in the majority opinion, a plaintiff presumably would have to show
that the forum state was the state in which an overwhelming majority of the
defendant's activity took place in the forum state, even if that state was
426
. pnnc1pa
. . l p1ace ofb usmess.
.
someh ow not Its
This approach is a dramatic departure from a significant body of case
law. 427 Until Goodyear, the Court did not suggest such a narrow view of
general jurisdiction.428 And the overwhelming body of lower court case law
was to the contrary. 429
Justice Ginsberg's opinion implies that the goal for her new test is
twofold. First, it avoids unfair forum shopping. 430 As she explained, without
the narrowing of general jurisdiction, a Polish driver injured in Poland could
sue Daimler in the United States.431 Second, despite the imprecision of her
423
Rhodes, supra note 54, at 893-99 (discussing the development of the "continuous and
systematic" contacts requirement, as well as the reasonableness or fairness factors).
424
John Deere sells agricultural, construction, and forestry equipment at 38 dealerships
throughout the state. John Deere Dealers in Mississippi, https://www.machinefinder.com/ww/
en-US/john-deere-dealers/mississippi (last visited Feb. 8, 20 14).
425
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762, n.20.
4 26
See id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("(T]he majority announces the new rule that
in order for a foreign defendant to be subject to general jurisdiction, it must not only possess
continuous and systematic contacts with a forum State, but those contacts must also surpass
some unspecified level when viewed in comparison to the company's 'nationwide and
worldwide' activities."). See also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 30-31)
(noting that Justice Ginsburg stopped short of saying a corporation would never be subject to
general jurisdiction outside its state of incorporation or principal place of business, but that
such a case would be "exceptional").
427
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J. , concurring) (referring to the test
announced by the majority as "a new rule of constitutional law that is unmoored from decades
of precedent.").
428
See discussion supra Part IY.b.i.A.
4 29
See Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 549 (reviewing general jurisdiction pre-Goodyear).
43
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5) (describing the majority as being
in "a rush to protect defendants from the perceived evils of forum shopping").
43 1
Daimler, ! 34 S. Ct. at 751. The Court had no need to limit general jurisdiction to avoid
allowing such a suit to proceed in a court in the United States. A defendant could easily invoke
forum non conveniens to have the case dismissed. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
248-49 (1981). Alternatively, as Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Daimler made
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test,432 Justice Ginsburg believes that it offers greater clarity than does, for
example, Justice Sotomayor's more traditional test which considers contacts
and fairness factors. 433
Her analysis begs a question discussed above: what is the underlying
434
justification for general jurisdiction? Neither Goodyear nor Daimler offer
. answers.435 By companson,
.
.f due process protects a
very compe 11mg
1
defendant' s right to fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, rejecting
general jurisdiction in a venue where a corporation may conduct extensive
day-to-day activity makes little sense. Perhaps limiting general jurisdiction
does not matter. After all, the scholars who proposed limiting general
jurisdiction did so with the expectation that specific jurisdiction would be
readily available.436 But as developed in the next section, some members of
the Court are ready to narrow specific jurisdiction as well. 437
2.

Specific Jurisdiction: Up in the Air

In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg stated that, in effect, specific jurisdiction
has expanded dramatically since it was "cut loose from Pennoyer' s sway,"
while general jurisdiction has "followed [a] markedly different
trajector[y].',438 Her statement concerning specific jurisdiction may be
premature.
As indicated above, by 1990, the Court was deeply divided over the
appropriate rules governing jurisdiction.439 This is most evident in Asahi,
where the Court could not agree on the relevance of contacts that came about
440
through the stream of commerce.
At the root of the division was a
disagreement dating back to the 1950s when the Court decided McGee and
Hanson: must contacts come about through purposeful activity on the party
of a defendant?44 1 Since 2010, the Court has revisited specific jurisdiction
twice. In J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the Court remained deeply

clear, the Court could have held that even if defendant's contacts with the forum are
substantial, jurisdiction is nonetheless unreasonable. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J. ,
concurring).
432
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see supra p. 35.
433
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764-65 (majority opinion).
434
See supra pp. 30-31.
435
See discussion supra Parts IV.b.i.A, IY.b.i.B.
4
36
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58).
437
See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii.
438 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757-58.
43
9 See supra Part Ill.b.i.
440
See supra pp. 234-235.
441
See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
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divided over the same issues that divided the Court in Asahi. And while
443
the Court's most recent specific jurisdiction decision was unanimous, it
444
signals the Court's willingness to limit the scope of specific jurisdiction.
1.

J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro

After Justice Stevens retired, commentators expected the Court to
clarify the test for determining the sufficiency of the stream of commerce
when it granted certiorari in Nicastro. 445 That did not happen.446
The plaintiff, Robert Nicastro, seriously injured his hand when he was
operating a machine manufactured by J. Mcintyre, Ltd., a British
447
corporation. The plaintiff sued in New Jersey where he worked and was
448
injured.
Perhaps because the plaintiffs lawyer engaged in limited
discovery, the record demonstrated little contact between the defendant and
the forum state.449 As observed by Justice Kennedy in his plurality opinion,
"[t]he question here is whether the New Jersey courts have jurisdiction over
J. Mcintyre, notwithstanding the fact that the compan/o at no time either
marketed goods in the State or shipped them there.'.4 The quantity and
quality of the defendant's contacts with New Jersey were a matter of dispute
within the Court, with each of the three opinions offering a different view of

°

44 2

J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion).
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
444
See discussion infra Part Y .a.
445
See, e.g., Jonathan A. Berke!hammer, Supreme Court to Readdress Stream of
Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 350, 35 1 (2011) ("The
contours of the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction . . . have remained
uncertain, at least, perhaps, until now."); Kendall Gray, J. Mcintyre Machinery v. Nicastro:
Declarifying Asahi, APPELLATE RECORD (June 28, 2011), http:// www.appellaterecord.com/
20 11 /06/arti cles/new -opi n ions/j -me intyre-machinery-v-n icastro-declari fying -asah i
("Professors and law nerds everywhere had the vapors because the Supreme Court of the
United States had a chance to clear [Asahl] up in J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.").
446
See infra text accompanying notes 451-82. See also Elisabeth A. Beal, Note, J.
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro: The Stream-of-Commerce Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction in a Globalized Economy, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 241-42 (2011) ("[N]o
member of the Court could obtain a majority of the votes, and thus the status of the stream-ofcommerce theory of personal jurisdiction remains unclear."); Greg Saetrum, Note, Righting the
Ship: Implications of J. Mcintyre v. Nicastro and How to Navigate the Stream of Commerce in
Its Wake, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 499, 536 (2013) ("The Nicastro decision has once again divided the
stream-of-commerce analysis, with three separate paths emerging in the wake of the
decision.").
447
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (plurality opinion).
448
/d. ; see also Beal, supra note 446, at 242.
449
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J. , concurring) ("There may well have been
other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction .. . the factual
record leaves many open questions . .. ").
450
/d. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
443
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the facts. 45 1
Apparently, the defendant created a subsidiary, J. Mcintyre America, to
market its products in the United States.452 By the time of trial, the
subsidiary was bankrupt.453 In addition, as hinted at by Justice Breyer in his
concurring opinion, the plaintiffs lawyer did not make an effort to show the
degree of control exercised by the defendant over its American distributor.454
As a result, the record was sparse. According to Justice Breyer's opinion, the
record included evidence of the sale of only one machine in New Jersey, that
the defendant hoped to sell its machines to anyone in the United States, and
that its employees attended trade shows in the United States, but not in New
Jersey specifically. 455 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion also observed that
the plaintiff did not allege that J. Mcintyre America was under the
defendant's control.456 He observed that the New Jersey Supreme Court
relied in part on the fact that J. Mcintyre America "structured [its]
advertising and sales efforts in accordance with [the defendant's] direction
457
and gm"d ance wh en ever poss1"ble. "
Justice Ginsburg' s dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan,
focused on efforts by the defendant to market its products in the United
States.458 The defendant "engaged Mcintyre America to attract customers
459
'from anywhere in the United States. "' It sought to "reach and profit from

451

See id. at 2790 ("[U)p to four machines ended up in New Jersey"); id. at 2791 (Breyer,
J., concurring) ("The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a
New Jersey customer ... "); id. at 2803 n.l5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The plurality notes the
low volume of sales in New Jersey . _ . A $24,900 shearing machine, however, is unlikely to
sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given state. By dollar value, the price of a single
machine represents a signifi cant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of
flannel shirts . . _ [t]he Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that
State."). Justice Ginsburg also cited information concerning the robust scrap metal industry in
New Jersey while Justice Kennedy did not consider this information - perhaps because he
viewed it as not properly part of the record. Adam N_ Steinman, The Lay of the Land:
Examining the Three Opinions in J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV.
48 1, 494-95 (20 12).
452
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J _, dissenting).
453
!d. at 2796 n.2.
4 4
!d. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
5
455
!d. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring). In fac t, the case did not turn out to be a stream-ofcommerce case. The facts did not present the Court with an assertion of jurisdiction over a
component parts manufacrurer who shipped the product to another company that then
incorporated the component part into a finished product and that then shipped the product to
the forum. Jd.
4 56 !d. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
457
/d.
458
/d. at 2794, 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4
59 !d. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J , dissenting).
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the United States market as a whole."460 Justice Ginsburg found that the
defendant must have intended to sell its product in the "largest scrap metal
461
market" in the United States when it targeted the national market.
Six Justices disagreed with her approach. Using Hanson as the starting
point for his analysis, Justice Kennedy and four Justices462 agreed that "[a]s
a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the
defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws. ,,463 The plurality rejected the idea that due process involved a general
notion of fair process on the grounds that "[f]reeform notions of fundamental
fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment
rendered in the absence of authority into law.'.4 64 Citing Hanson again,
Justice Kennedy emfshasized the fact that a defendant must act with purpose
towards the forum. 4 5 According to the plurality, a defendant must submit to
the state's authority and may do so in a number of ways, including through
explicit consent, presence within the state, citizenship or domicile,
incorporation in the state or establishment of a principal place of business in
the state.466 These examples demonstrate circumstances or a course of
conduct from which to infer "an intention to submit to the laws of the forum
State.'.467 For out-of-state defendants, acting with purpose towards the state
provides similar evidence that the defendant submits to the state's authority
with regards to suits arising out of the forum contact.468 As developed
below, the plurality staked out a radical position, harking back to the
rejected theory· of consent.469
For Justices Breyer and Alito, the case before the Court did not raise
470
many of the yet unresolved challenges facing courts around the country.
460

!d. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
!d. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4
62
!d. at 2785 (plurality opinion).
463
/d. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that exceptions may exist, "for instance, in cases involving an intentional tort.
But the general rule is applicable in this products-liability case, and the so-called 'stream-ofcommerce ' doctrine cannot displace it." /d.
464
ld. at 2787.
465 ld.
466
!d.
467
Jd.
461

468

Jd. at 2787-88.
See id. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (" [I]n International Shoe itself, and
decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably . . . ' implied consent,'
should be discarded ... . Whatever the state of academic debate over the role of consent in
modem jurisdictional doctrines, the plurality's notion that consent is the animating concept
draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.").
470
/d. at 2791-95 (Breyer, J. , concurring).
469
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Recognizing that many changes in commerce and communications may
require rethinking the Court's precedent, Justice Breyer found that Nicastro
471
did not present those questions. He underscored that the plaintiff failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating sufficient contacts with the forum state.472
Mcintyre America was "an independent distributor.'"'73 The distributor had
only made one sale in New Jersey even though the defendant was willing to
sell machines to anyone interested in buying them anywhere in the United
States.474 Justice Breyer rejected the idea that the Court's precedent allowed
the assertion of jurisdiction based on a single sale "accompanied by the kind
of sales effort indicated here.''475 The concurring opinion suggested that the
two Justices might be open to a stream of commerce argument but found that
the record showed no regular flow of goods into the forum.476
The concurring opinion rejected the idea that the mere arrival of the
product in the forum state should lead to jurisdiction.477 The opinion left
open a number of questions and suggested participation by the Solicitor
General, presumably to provide a better insight into broad concerns about
478
modern commercial circumstances.
Discussed in more detail below, the current state of affairs after
Nicastro is troubling.479 Justice Kennedy is one vote short of significantly
. spec1.fi1c JUriS
. . d.tchon.
.
Th e d.tssent480 and others481 h ave commented
narrowmg
471

/d. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring).
/d. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). ("Mr. Nicastro, who bears the burden of proving
jurisdiction, has shown no specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey. He
has introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers ... And he has not otherwise shown
that the British Manufacturer 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting
activities ' within New Jersey, or that it delivered goods in the stream of commerce ' with the
expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users.").
47
3
/d. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
474 Jd.
472

475
/d. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). No doubt, he had in mind the fact that the
defendant did not create the contact. Surely, he did not intend to disavow single contact cases
like McGee.
476
/d. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Because the incident at issue in this case does
not implicate modem concerns, and because the factual record leaves many open questions,
this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic
jurisdictional rules.").
477
/d. at 2792 (Breyer, J. , concurring).
478
/d. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
479
See discussion infra Part V; see also Saetrum, supra note 446, at 5 19 ("If the plurality
opinion in Nicastro was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court, foreign
manufacturers would have a blueprint for escaping U.S. jurisdiction while simultaneously
exploiting the U.S. market. This would place U.S. manufactures at a severe competitive
disadvantage to their foreign counterparts and force many U.S . consumers to suffer the
burdens of litigating products-liability claims overseas.").
480 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[I]n International Shoe
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on the theory implicit in the plurality opinion, which is the idea that one had
to consent to jurisdiction. In Nicastro, Justice Ginsburg argued that the
theory was rejected long ago and finds flO support in the Court's modern
case law.482
Justice is a reminder of the point raised above that hard cases make bad
law.483 A decision that seemed out of line with the Court's then current view
of due process evidenced in McGee and grounded in overt result orientation
has become the centerpiece of the conservative Justices' due process
jurisprudence.484 Unlike Justice White's opinion in World-Wide, where he
linked the contacts part of the Court's test to sovereignty,485 Justice Kennedy
does not fall into that morass. Instead, he gives predominant importance to a
defendant's choice to make itself amenable to suit in the forum. 486 Hence, a
defendant who can point to no great inconvenience or lack of opportunity to
be heard may avoid suit in a forum despite benefiting indirectly from the
sales of its product in the forum state.
ii.

Walden v. Fiore: Closing Open Questions?

The Court's split in Nicastro has left lower courts with little
guidance.487 A number of lower courts have continued to uphold jurisdiction
in cases where the defendant did not direct purposeful activity towards the
forum state. 488 For example, some state courts continue to adhere to the

itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably . . .
'implied consent,' should be discarded . .. ").
481 See Steinman, supra note 451, at 497 ("A second aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion
is his insistence that jurisdiction is appropriate only when a person 'submi (ts] to a State's
authority"'); see also Saetrum, supra note 446, at 516 (noting that very few corporations ever
consciously submit to the power of a state).
482
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the state of
academic debate over the role of consent in modem jurisdictional doctrines, he plurality's
notion that consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of
this Court.").
483 I d. at 2787. See also supra Part ll.c.
484
See discussion supra Part II.c.; see also Borchers, supra note 325, at 1246 (criticizing
the plurality opinion as an attempt "to roll back the clock by a century or more and re-ground
personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty theo1y that the Court had apparently rejected
several times before").
485 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291-92 (1980).
486
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
487
See Steinman, supra note 451, at 491 ("The lack of any majority opinion in Mcintyre
largely thwarts the possibility of' greater c larity"'); see also Amanda ller, Comment, Bridging
the Stream of Commerce: Recommendations for Living in the Post-Nicastro Era, 45
MCGEORGE L. REv. 407, 409 (2013) ("[I]n Nicastro, a divided Court issued no clear guidance
or test ... ").
488 Iler, supra note 487, at 415 (citing a Louisiana decision where the judge stated that
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stream of commerce theory to assure a convenient forum for the plaintiff.489
Some commentators expected the Court to use the second personal
jurisdiction case on the 2013 docket, Walden v. Fiore, to clarify some of the
.
.
490 I d.d
ongomg
tssues.
t 1 not.
Transportation Security Administration agents searched Gina Fiore and
Keith Gipson and their carry-on luggage as they departed from the San Juan,
491
Puerto Rico airport.
The agents found a large amount of cash in their
492
Fiore explained to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
luggage.
agents in San Juan that she and Gipson were professional gamblers and had
493
been gambling at a San Juan casino.
A law enforcement official in San
Juan contacted DEA agents in Atlanta and told them about Fiore and
494
.
G1pson.
Upon their arrival in Atlanta, Fiore and Gipson were stopped by
Anthony Walden, a Covington, Georgia police officer, deputized as part of a
task force in the DEA's airport drug interdiction program.495 Fiore and
Gipson told Walden and another agent that the cash they were carrying was
496
their gambling "bank" plus winnings. The agents retained the cash after
497
they exposed it to a drug-sniffing dog.
Fiore and Gipson flew home
498
without the cash.
The DEA refused to return the cash despite the efforts of Fiore and

Justice Breyer's opinion was binding, but that Justice Breyer had declined to accept a new
rule, the court declined to depart from Fifth Circuit precedent).
489 See Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2013)
(reading Nicastro narrowly and disagreeing that it prohibited the application of the stream-ofcommerce theory in other types of cases); AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d
1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Because Mcintyre did not produce a majority opinion, we must
follow the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case ... that the law remains
the same after Mcintyre."); see also Levi McAllister, Comment, Paddling the Stream of
Commerce: The Supreme Court's Need to Cautiously Re-Examine One Aspect of Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Judicial and Financial Consequences Resulting from Current
Approaches, 3 HIGH CT. Q. REv. 53, 57-58 (2007) (discussing splits among lower courts
followin g Nicastro).
490
See, e.g., Stephen Higdon, Comment, If It Wasn't on Purpose, Can a Court Take It
Personally? Untangling Asahi 's Mess that J. Mcintyre Did Not, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 463,
496 n.259 ("(T]he Court has granted certiorari to another personal jurisdiction case . . . .
Perhaps, then, clarity - rather than continued confusion - is on the horizon. ").
4 1
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 111 9 (2014).
9
492 !d.
493
/d.
494
!d.
495
/d.
496 !d.
497
/d.
498
/d.
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Bart

of
Gipson's attorney. 499 Instead, Walden helped draft an affidavit as
00
forfeiture proceedings and forwarded it to the U.S. Attorney's Office. The
government did not pursue forfeiture and eventually retun1ed the money to
Fiore and Gipson. 501
Fiore and Gipson filed suit against Walden in federal court in
Nevada. 502 Their complaint alleged a violation of their Fourth Amendment
503
rights based on illegal seizure and detention of their cash. Furthermore,
they alleged that Walden's affidavit was false and misleading in that it
misrepresented the encounter at the airport and excluded exculpatory
information. 504 Walden filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 505 The district court granted the motion, which the Ninth Circuit
reversed.506 While it agreed that the illegal search part of the claim could not
support jurisdiction in Nevada, the court could exercise jurisdiction based on
the "false probable cause aspect of the case."507 According to the Ninth
Circuit, under Calder v. Jones, Walden "expressly aimed" his conduct at
Nevada508 when he submitted the affidavit because he knew that it would
509
affect the plaintiffs - who had a significant connection with the forum.
510
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The
opinion laid out the general rules governing specific jurisdiction. 511 A
defendant must create the contacts with the forum. 12 Due process protects a
litigant's liberty interest, "not the convenience of plaintiffs or third
513
parties."
A plaintiffs act in creating contacts with the forum does not

499

!d.

500

!d. at 1119-20.
/d. at 1120.
502
/d. ("Respondents alleged that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
( I) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping the money after concluding it did not
come from drug-related activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable cause affidavit to
support a forfeiture action while knowing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully
seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory information; and (5) withholding that
exculpatory information from the United States Attorney's Office.").
503
!d. at 1119-20.
504 !d. at 1120.
505 !d.
506 /d.
50 1

507

/d. (quoting Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558,577 (9th Cir. 2011)).
5os Jd. (quoting Fiore, 688 F.3d at 577).
509
/d. at 1119-20.
510
!d. at 1119-22.
51 1
!d. at 1122 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 47 1 U.S. 462,475 ( 1985)).
512 Jd.
5 13
/d. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 41 7
( 1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)).
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count. 514 A defendant's contacts must be with the forum state, not with an
individual in the state. 515 But those general rules did not square!~ address the
plaintiffs' strongest argument, their reliance on Calder v. Jones. 16
Lower courts are divided over how broadly to read Calder. 517 Justice
Thomas gave it a narrow reading. "These same principles," as laid out
above, "apply when intentional torts are involved." 518 He explained that
Calder turned on "the various contacts the defendants had created with
California (and not just with the plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous
story."519 The crux of Calder was that the effects of the defendants' conduct
connected the defendants with the forum; defendants' intentional tort oflibel
occurred in California where the loss of the plaintiffs reputation took
520
place.
By contrast, none of Walden' s conduct took place in Nevada.52 1 He
never traveled to, sent anything to, or took any action in Nevada. 522 The
plaintiffs, not the defendant, formed the contacts with the forum.523 Justice
Thomas rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that Walden's knowledge that
Fiore and Gipson had forum connections was dispositive.524 Even if the
focus is on the continuation of the seizure of the funds, those effects are not
attributable to Walden; the plaintiffs chose where to go after they were
525
deprived of their funds.
Post- Walden ana~sis has focused on the difficult line drawing between
Calder and Walden. 5 6 Some commentators conclude that Walden was a

514

!d.

515

!d. at 1122-23.
!d.

516

517
Compare Janmark v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T)here can be no
serious doubt after Calder that the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury may
entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor."), with IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155
F.3d 254, 265 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("[W]e ... agree with the conclusion reached by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that jurisdiction under Calder requires more
than a finding that the harm caused by the defendant's intentional tort is primarily felt within
the forum.").
518
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
519
!d. at 1123-24.
520 !d.
521

Id. at 1124.
/d.
523
!d.
524
/d.
525
!d. at 1125.
526
See, e.g., Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,
751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 20 14) (addressing the split that had existed among courts regarding
Calder, and stating that Walden helped resolve some of the ambiguity: "[A]fter Walden there
can be no doubt that 'the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
522
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fairly easy case.527 For example, at the time of the stop in San Juan, th~
plaintiffs showed the agents California identification.52 They maintained
residences in Nevada and Califomia.529 As a result, the fact that effects may
have been felt in Nevada appears random. Other scholars have defended the
Ninth Circuit's position and sug~est that the court's unanimous opinion
downplayed the effects in Nevada. 30
As developed by Justice Thomas, one might agree that even under a
broad reading of Calder, the case for jurisdiction was weak. Walden
presumably knew that the plaintiffs were going to Nevada - they were
taking a flight to Las Vegas - but may not have been aware that they
resided in Califomia. 53 1 Somewhat more troubling is that Justice Thomas
interpreted the black letter law as requiring the application of the same
principles from intentional tort cases in personal jurisdiction cases; meaning
jurisdiction must be based on "intentional conduct by the defendant that
creates the necessary contacts with the forum."532 Although not without
ambiguity, that language sounds narrower than the language in Calder,
where the Court observed that the defendants "knew" that the effects would
be felt in the forum state. 533
Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Nicastro,
where Justice Kennedy insisted that only purposeful contacts with the forum
are sufficient. 534 It remains uncertain whether Justice Thomas has moved the
Court closer to adopting that narrow view of minimum contacts . As
developed below, such a position would have significant implications for the
state courts attempting to assert jurisdiction over foreign and many out-of-

forum. "' (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122)).
527
See Howard Wasserman, More Personal Jurisdiction from SCOTUS, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Feb. 25, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20 14/02/more-personaljurisdiction-from-scotus.html; see also Supreme Court Says P's Gambling Winnings, Seized by
Drug Agent in State A, Can 't Support Jurisdiction of Agent in State B, 267 SIEGEL'S PRAC.
REv. 4 (2014) ("Considering the court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman only a few months
ago . .. the Walden case is no surprise. In Daimler the U.S. Supreme Court severely
circumscribed the 'presence' test as a basis for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
The claim itself must have local roots, the (C]ourt held, and if it hasn't, the corporation's
overall contacts with the state won' t support jurisdiction.").
528
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
529 !d.
530

See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra B. Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 227-230 (20 14) (suggesting that the Ninth
Circuit was justified in finding jurisdiction proper under Calder given the state of the law prior
to Walden).
531
Walden 134 S. Ct. at 1119, 1125.
532
!d. at I 123.
533
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 ( 1984).
534
J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 13 1 S. Ct. 2780,2787-88 (20 11).
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state defendants.535
V.

AVOIDING SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES

Goodyear and Daimler are clear on one thing: plaintiffs will be able to
invoke general jurisdiction in fewer locations than before those cases were
decided.536 Seldom will a plaintiff be able to invoke general jurisdiction
when the defendant is a forei~ corporation.537 Harder questions arise with
38
regard to specific jurisdiction. This section begins with some speculation
about the various Justices' motivations in aligning ·themselves on
jurisdictional questions. 539 It then explores the implications that the Court's
540
new retrenchment has for foreign corporations.
A.

Pity the Poor Defendant?

A good place to start is accusing the conservative wing of the Court of a
pro-corporate bias. 541 Cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election
542
Commission support such a conclusion. Of course, that cannot explain the

535

See discussion infra Part V.
See supra Part JY .b.i.; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4)
(discussing the shrinking of general jurisdiction in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler).
536

537
Foreign corporations are not incorporated in the United States and do not have their
principal places of business in the United States. Finding a case in which the largest amount of
a foreign corporation's business nonetheless takes place in a state within the United States
seems highly unlikely.
538
See infra text accompanying notes 548-59, 565-71; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer,
supra note 9 (manuscript at 60) (predicting that the Court will continue to reject any attempts
by plaintiffs to expand speci fie jurisdiction).
539
See discussion infra Part V.a.
540
See discussion infra Part V .b.
541
See Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Ruled in Favor of the Nation's Top Corporate
Interest Group in 7 of 8 Cases This Term, THTNKPROGRESS (March 13, 2014),
http://th inkprogress.org/justice/20 14/03/ 13/3 398661 /supreme-court-ruled-in-favor-of-thenations-top-corporate-interest-group-in-7 -of-8-cases-this-term (reporting that during the
current term, the Court has sided with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in almost every case
where the Chamber has filed a brief); see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript
at 64-65) ("Taken to their logical conclusion, Justice Ginsburg' s formal rules introduce a new
era of vested rights for corporations ... cloaking corporations with unprecedented immunities
that were never suggested by earlier decis ions ... ").
542
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm' n, 558 U.S. 3 10 (2010) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibited a law limiting political expenditures by corporations and labor unions);
See also Woody R. Clermont, Business Associations Reign Supreme: The Corporatist
Underpinnings of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
4 77 (20 I 0) (criticizing Citizens United and the conservative members of the Court for favoring
corporate personhood over the rights of individuals); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9
(manuscript at 64) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Daimler demonstrated her desire

268

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 21:2

result in Walden , where the defendant was not a business entity.54 3 The
conservative wing of the Court might also be accused of an anti-plaintiff
bias - willing to narrow the courthouse door in cases involving the
historically liberal pleading rules. 544
As mentioned above, Daimler suggested that the Court was intent on
bringing United States law in line with European law. 545 Elsewhere, some of
the conservatives on the Court have railed against reliance on international
norms in interpreting domestic law. 546 They were, however, silent on Justice
Ginsburg's reliance on European law.
While one might see the conservative Justices' pro-corporate bias at
work in their views, dismissing the "liberal" wing as pro-corporate seems
too facile an explanation for their positions in Goodyear, Daimler, and
Walden. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Nicastro suggests a different
possibility. As argued by Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer, Justice
Ginsburg's general jurisdiction opinions relied on the views of prominent
scholars who urged the narrowing of general jurisdiction.547 They faulted the
Court for not recognizing that the argument for narrowing general
548
jurisdiction was premised on the expansion of specific jurisdiction.
At
least in light of Justice Ginsburg's Nicastro dissent, she and Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan would have found s~ecific jurisdiction on the facts of
Nicastro by relying on traditional case law. 49
to "effectuat[e] corporate planning track arguments repeatedly advanced by the Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S .").
543
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014).
544 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (dismissing a case because it
failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim despite liberal pleading rules); Adam N.
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1325-26 (2010) (discussing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal as examples of "the Court's recent prodefendant leanings," stating that "the Court gave defendants one more tool for thwarting civil
accountability by discarding the long-established, liberal pleading framework that was among
the most notable aspects oftbe original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ).
545
See supra pp. 253-255.
546 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J. , dissenting)
(denouncing the majority opinion for citing as persuasive authority the international trend
toward abolishing capital punishment for juveniles, stating that "the basic premise of the
Court's argument - that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the worldought to be rejected out of hand.").
547
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58) ("Justice Ginsburg's opinions
advocate a particular agenda for reforming the law of personal jurisdiction proposed in the
1960s and 1970s by Professors von Mehren and Trautman.").
548
/d. (" Given the expanding role [Professors von Mehren and Trautman] proposed for
specific jurisdiction, they regarded most of the fonns of general jurisdiction as unnecessary
and irrational. They thus urged the elimination of almost all form s of general jurisdiction. ").
549
J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 13 1 S. Ct. 2780, 2804 (201 1) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the defendant should have been subject under a specific jurisdiction
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The four recent decisions are unsettling. While Justice Alito joined
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Nicastro, 550 his usual alliance with
the conservative wing of the Court is not reassuring.551 It is unclear whether
Justice Alito will join an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, squarely
requiring a plaintiff to show that a defendant purposefully directed activity
in the forum state. Especially in light of other developments - limiting in
rem actions and narrowing general jurisdiction - such a ruling would
severely limit a plaintiffs ability to bring suit in their home state in a variety
of cases. 552
That the Court has limited the jurisdictional reach of United States
courts seems odd at this point in history. As observed by Justice Breyer in
his concurring opinion in Nicastro, commerce and communications may
require rethinking the Court's traditional approach to personal
jurisdiction.553 The trend towards sweeping international trade agreements554
theory).
55°
!d. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
551
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310,316 (2010) (Justice
Alito joined the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia); see also General William K. Suter, Supreme Court Report, 44
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 333, 337 (2012) ("The so-called conservatives are the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Chief Justice and Justice A lito voted together about 95% of
the time."); Eric Alterman & Reed Richardson, Splenetic Justice: Justice Samuel A/ito's Role
on the Roberts Court, Tiffi NATION (June 28, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175026/
splenetic-justice-justice-samuel-alitos-role-roberts-court ("Thanks to Alito, who replaced the
moderate Justice O'Connor on the Court, the conservative bloc has scored one triumph after
another, and increasingly it's been in service of corporation-friendly organizations like the
Chamber of Commerce."); Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together
Most and Least Often, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 20 14), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/
06/24/upshot/24up-scotus-agreement-rates.html (finding that over the last four terms, Justice
Alito has voted with Justice Roberts 93% of the time, Justice Scalia 86% of the time, Justice
Thomas 90% of the time, and Justice Kennedy 85% of the time, while only voting with
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan far less often - 65, 69, and 69%, respectively);
Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/20J0/07/25/us/25roberts.html (stating that Justice Alito is one
of the six most conservative Justices that have sat on the Court out of the 44 Justices who have
served since 1937, calling him "exceptionally conservative"); Lee Epstein et al., How Business
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1431, 1450 (2013) (finding that Justice Alito is
one of the two most business-friendly justices to serve on the Court since 1946).
552 See discussion infra Part V.b.
553 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791, 2795 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (discussing increasing globalization and advances in technology, suggesting
that a change in current law may be justified given "a better understanding of the relevant
contemporary commercial circumstances.").
554 Hemandez, supra note 323, at 432-33 (noting that "the globalization of commerce over
the past 50 years presents a dramatic shift in American society" and that "the abandonment of
a manufacturing-based economy in the late twentieth century has resulted in the explosive
growth in foreign goods, which necessitates ... enabl[ing] states to provide redress to their
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and the access to infonnation via the Intemet555 multiply the instances in
which United States plaintiffs may seek to force an injury-causing foreign
defendant to respond to suit in the United States, rather than in a foreign
country. 556 At a minimum, injured plaintiffs want to avoid the added expense
of trying their cases abroad. Often, doing so involves not just added expense,
but less favorable substantive law557 and possible costs, including attorneys'
558
fees assessed to the losing party. Further, foreign judges andduries may be
5 9
unsympathetic to Americans seeking damages in their courts. Given these
considerations, one might have expected the trend to be more protective of
injured citizens.

B. How Real is the Problem?
Currently, a plaintiff suing a domestic corporation in a convenient
forum may be able to do so without difficulty. That is, Goodyear and
Daimler may have limited effect as long as the state where the plaintiff files
the action requires the corporation to appoint an agent for purposes of

citizens for injuries caused by defective goods manufactured abroad."); see also THOMAS A.
DICKERSON, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL TORTS IN U.S. COURTS § 1. (20 13) ("As the
world 's economy becomes more integrated, products and services move with increasing
frequency across national borders ... American courts and lawyers wrestle with ... Providing
redress when foreign products cause harm in the U.S.") .
555 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(establishing the "sliding scale" Internet jurisdiction test that considers the level of interactivity
or passivity of a defendant's website rather than purposeful availrnent); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F .3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, despite never having traveled
there, by creating an ongoing marketing relationship with the plaintiff corporation
headquartered in the forum); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)
(surveying approaches adopted by other courts, including the Zippo test, as well as tests that
examine the number of "hit" a website receives and other evidence that the Internet activity
was directed at the forum state).
556 For instance, following Nicastro, the plaintiff would have to sue in the UK in order to
recover for his injuries - resulting in added expenses, inconvenience, and other disadvantages
associated with litigating overseas.
557
FREER & PERDUE, supra note 336, at 62-63.
55H See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.l8 (1975)
("As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to successful
plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been empowered to award
counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards might be made to p laintiffs. Rules
governing administration of these and related provisions have developed over the years. It is
now customary in England, after litigation of substantive claims had terminated, to conduct
separate hearings before special 'taxing Masters' in order to determine the appropriateness and
the size of an award of counsel fees.").
559
FREER & PERDUE, supra note 336, at 62.
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560

accepting service of process. This is the case at least in states where the
state statute allows suit on any claim, not just one arising out of in-state
activity. 56 1 As mentioned above, one rnight.expect business organizations to
562
lobby state legislatures to narrow such statutes. But even after Goodyear
and Daimler, a plaintiff suing a domestic corporation ought to be able to find
at least one state in which it has its principal place of business or state of
incorporation. 563 That forum may not be convenient for the plaintiff and maJ:
not be able to provide favorable choice of law rules as in the past. 5
Nonetheless, the impact on plaintiffs may be muted.
As to specific jurisdiction, if the Court adopts a hard-and-fast
purposeful availment rule, an injured plaintiff may be at a real disadvantage
even when suing a domestic corporation in the state where the injury took
place. Think back to Mrs. Gray, injured when her hot water heater
exploded. 565 If the stream of commerce does not allow her to bring her claim
against Titan Valve, she may be forced to bifurcate her claim, try her case in
an inconvenient forum, or sue only the manufacturer that sold the product in
the forum with the risk of having the primary tortfeasor absent from the suit.
The implications are even more pronounced for United States plaintiffs
suing foreign corporations. Goodyear and Daimler appear to leave little
room for an American injured by a foreign corporation to sue that
corporation in the United States based on an accident occurring abroad.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Daimler, the plaintiffs in Goodyear were United
566
States citizens.
But for the fact that Goodyear USA, the garent
corporation, was subject to suit somewhere in the United States, 67 the

560

561

See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
!d.

562 See supra text accompanying note 421 . A litigant might also attempt to challenge such
statutes as coercive and in violation of the Commerce Clause. Early precedent suggested that
argument. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
563 One might wonder whether a corporation 's state of incorporation is a suitable forum
for all-purpose jurisdiction. That corporation would have chosen that forum for tax purposes
and perhaps because of favorable forum law. Those considerations have little to do with
convenience to any of the litigants. Despite that, as Goodyear and Daimler demonstrate, courts
routinely recite the black letter law that the state of incorporation is an appropriate forum. I
find the staying power of that rule of law odd. I have not been able to find any modem case in
which the corporate defendant' s only contact with the forum state is its state of incorporation.
564 See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (finding that although the
injury occurred in Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs were able to file suit in Mississippi and take
advantage of a favorable statute of limitations because John Deere Co. had continuous and
systematic contacts there).
565 See supra p. 11.
566 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,2850 (2011).
561 Goodyear, 13 I S. Ct. at 2850 ("Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina
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plaintiffs' only recourse would have been to sue abroad in France,
Luxembourg, or Turkey. Few foreign corporations, if any, are likely to
satisfy Justice Ginsburg's "at home" test in any state within the United
568
States. Even if they conduct a massive amount of business in a particular
state, that alone is not enough. 569 Her test focuses not only on the amount of
business in state, but it also requires that the amount of business in that state
predominates; systematic and continuous contacts are not sufficient. 570 That
standard is a major departure from precedent and far more rigorous than the
previous standard. Predicting how the new test applies may be difficult, but
the test seems to require a showing of more than substantial contacts with
the forum: "[g]eneral jurisdiction ... calls for an appraisal of a corporation's
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. "57 1
Surprisingly, only Justice Sotomayor picked up on the significant
change in the law that the Court made in the Diarnler decision.572 Instead of
focusing on in-state contacts, the Court also now requires an inquiry into
contacts elsewhere. As she quipped, some corporations are "too big for
general jurisdiction." 573 She may have understated the extent to which the
Court has changed the law, as can be seen by comparing the new standard to
some earlier cases.
In Daimler, the defendant conceded that its subsidiary MBUSA would
be subject to general jurisdiction in California. 574 That is hardly unusual. In
Goodyear, Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction based on the fact that
it had factories and a workforce in state. 575 Those corporate defendants
seemed to concede that at some point, a large enough presence in state was
all that a plaintiff had to demonstrate for general jurisdiction.
Some foreign corporations seemed to have that same understanding of
and regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest the North Carolina court's
jurisdiction over it.").
568
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 36) ('"(T]he ultimate effect of the
majority's approach will be to shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the
individuals harmed by their actions.' While the majority expressed little concern for foreign
plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant for foreign conduct, Justice Sotomayor observed that its
decision reached farther. She provided examples of cases where the majority opinion appears
to preclude jurisdiction over claims by U.S. plaintiffs in appropriate state courts." (quoting
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773)).
569
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62 n.20.
570
Jd. at 762 n.20 (2014); see also supra p. 28.
571
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
572
ld. at 763-73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9
(manuscript at 5-6).
573
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
574
!d. at 758.
575
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (20 II).
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the law. World-Wide offered a dramatic instance to measure the change
effected by Daimler. There, not only did the plaintiffs sue the New York
576
seller and tri-state distributor. They also sued Volkswagen of America and
Audi. 577 Volkswagen initially objected to jurisdiction, but did not pursue the
578
Audi apparently did not object even in the trial
matter before the Court.
court. 579 Presumably, the plaintiffs would have relied on a showing of the
extensive contacts between Audi and the forum state.
After Daimler, jurisdiction over Audi in Oklahoma would be doubtful.
Despite substantial sales in that state, Audi almost certainly does not have a
large enough percentage of its sales in state to be "at home" there. 580 That
begs the question of what options would be open to the plaintiffs in such a
case?
As implicit in Justice White's opinion, Oklahoma was a convenient
forum. 581 The seriously burned plaintiffs were treated there, the accident
582
took place there, and the wreckage of the vehicle remained there. Had the
driver of the vehicle who slammed into the Audi been solvent, suit against
him in Oklahoma would have been appr~riate. 583 Indeed, suing him
elsewhere would not have been feasible. 5 Whether jurisdiction over
Volkswagen in Oklahoma would have been proper is also uncertain, but
585
again, as with Audi, doubtful.
New York would not have been a convenient forum. 586 But even if the
plaintiffs sought to file their action there, jurisdiction may not have been
proper over all of the parties. Surely, the Oklahoma driver who caused the
accident was beyond the jurisdictional reach of a New York court. 587
Jurisdiction may have been proper there based on specific jurisdiction as to
Volkswagen (on the assumption that it acted with purpose vis-a-vis the New

576
577
578
579
580

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
Jd

Jd. at 288 n.3.
!d. at 288.

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294.
582
C harles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson - The Rest of the Story, 72
NEB. L. REv. 1122, 1123 ( 1993 ). See also supra note 185.
583
Adams, supra note 582, at 1127.
584
Unless the plaintiffs could serve him in hand in some other state, presumably he would
not be subject to jurisdiction in any other state.
585
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
586
Most of the events and witnesses were in Oklahoma, not New York. World-Wide, 444
U.S. at 583-84.
587
Unless the plaintiffs served the driver in New York, jurisdiction would have been
improper. Presumably, he had no contacts with New York and certainly none that related to
the claim against him for negligence.
581
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York defendants). 588 Whether Audi could make a plausible objection to
specific jurisdiction in New York depends on which wing of the Court wins
the Nicastro debate.589
Audi is a lot larger than is J. Mcintyre Ltd. 590 But assume that attorneys
for corporations like Audi reconfigure how they do business with their
United States subsidiaries. For example, J. Mcintyre Ltd., at least according
to the record, did not direct its subsidiary's marketing activity in the United
591
States. Thus, creating a business relationship that formally cedes control
to one's United States distributor may create immunity from suit even in
specific jurisdiction cases. 592
Such a result depends on whether Justice Kennedy can persuade either
Justice Breyer or Alito to join his restrictive view of due process. Given
Justice Alito 's generally pro-corporate views, further limiting the
jurisdictional reach of domestic courts is not farfetched. 593
Nor should one take much comfort in Justice Kennedy's assurances
that, were Congress to act, federal courts may be amenable to suit in cases
where a defendant may not have sufficient contacts with a particular state,
but does with the United States as a whole.594 His statement is premised on
the fact that such a case would be determined based on Fifth, not Fourteenth,
Amendment due process. 595 In such a case, the contacts would be with the
588

See supra p. 17.
See supra Part IV.b.ii.A. For example, if a United States subsidiary markets the
product and solicits business, not the foreign company, the foreign corporation would not have
act with purpose towards the forum under Justice Kennedy's strict formulation of purposeful
availment.
590
Audi 's revenue in 2008 was €34,196 million. Audi 2008 Financial Report, AUDI AG
(2009), http://www.audi.com/content/dam/corn!EN/investor-relationslfinancial_reports/annualreports/2008_ audi_annual_financial_report.pdf. J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd.'s revenue in
2008 was €6.90 million. J Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. Company Profile, YAHOO! FfNANCE,
http://biz.yahoo.com/id134/ 134!52.htrnl (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
591
J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (20 II).
592
!d. at 2786, 279 1.
593
See supra note 22.
594
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
595
James C. Smith, Comment, Online Communities as Territorial Units: Personal
Jurisdiction over Cyberspace after J. Mcintyre, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 839,
858-59 (2013) ("Justice Kennedy 's opinion in J. Mcintyre obliquely refers to the fact that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), for state-law claims - which include gardenvariety contract and defamation claims - the jurisdictional reach of the district courts is
coextensive with that of state courts. Consequently, as of today, if a non-U.S. defendant avoids
jurisdiction in each of the fifty states, that defendant has also succeeded in avoiding the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Of course, Congress could, through appropriate legislation,
expand the jurisdiction of the district courts to the outer boundaries of the judicial power of the
United States as circumscribed in Article Ill of the Constitution. This is the path that Congress
must take in order for plaintiffs to have reasonable access to the courts to resolve disputes
589
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596

United States as the relevant forum.
Two problems exist with that
597
solution. For one, Congress is dysfunctional. Corporations would almost
certainly pour money into a campaign to defeat such Iegislation. 598
Secondly, some foreign corporations, even those shipping products to the
United States, may not be subject to personal jurisdiction even in the event
that Congress enacts a statute authorizing jurisdiction to the full extent of the
Fifth Amendment.
Here are two hypotheticals to underscore the second point. Consider a
case in which a German company has produced a component part
incorporated into a product assembled by another foreign corporation.599 The
end producer may be subject to jurisdiction in the United States, but would
the German company? On these facts alone, that company has not acted with
600
purpose towards the United States. At most, it has acted with knowledge
that its product will end up in the forum. As long as the ultimate producer is
solvent and cannot shift responsibility to the absent would-be defendant, a
plaintiff may not be at a disadvantage. But if the ultimate producer is
insolvent, the plaintiffs inability to bring suit against the part' s
manufacturer (who may be making millions of dollars from the United
States market) places the injured plaintiff at an obvious disadvantage. 601
originating in online communities.").
596 !d.
597
See generally Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, The Roots of Congressional Discord,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 18, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-debbiewasserman-schultz/congress-discord_ b_ 4123 823 .html (detailing the struggles and conflict
within Congress).
598
See, e.g., Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, Corporate Lobbying and Commitment
Failure in Capitol Taxation, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 241 n.3 (2003) (''The impact of
lobbyists on tax policy in the United States has been only informally documented, but the
evidence suggests that taxation is a primary consideration determining contributions of
political action comm ittees for many corporations").
599 See, for example, LIGHTWEIGHT, https:lllightweight.info/us/enl, which is a German
Bicycle wheel manufacturer that produces specialty carbon bicycle wheels that then can be
incorporated into any bicycle frame. The company does not manufacture a complete bicycle,
therefore to use the wheels they must be attached to a bicycle made by another company, for
example Raleigh, a British bicycle manufacturer.
600
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 ( 1987).
601
During oral argument in Nicastro, Justice Breyer asked counsel for the plaintiff a
hypothetical about asserting jurisdiction over a potter in India who made pottery for a larger
corporation. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780 (20 II ) (No. 13-25). Justice Kennedy used a similar example of an Appalachian
potter selling to a larger corporation. J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,
2793 (2011). The thrust of the questions was the obvious unfairness of compelling a producer
of a product from a far-away venue to appear for suit unless that producer has directed activity
to the forum. The examples are farfetched because a plainti ff would not bother to sue a person
making small quantities of goods for a large corporation . Further, jurisdiction in such cases
might fail because of the fairness aspect of the due process test. By contrast, some component
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Harder though would be a case in which a company uses a subsidiary to
market its product in the United States. Justice Kennedy seemed to assume
that J. Mcintyre Ltd. would have been subject to jurisdiction under a
congressionally enacted long-ann statute. 602 But depending on how the
foreign corporation structured its business, it may not have the requisite
contacts even with the United States as a whole. A corporation that does not
solicit business, but instead merely responds to another entity's request to
sell and ship its product to the forum, may not act with the requisite intent to
affiliate with the forum. 603 As Walden underscores, knowledge that one is
dealing with the forum is not enough to meet the stringent purposeful
604
Thus, if instead of directing
availment component of the Court's test.
activity to the forum, a foreign corporation allows a middle man to create the
contacts with the forum, it may be able to avoid jurisdiction in the United
States even if Congress enacted an international long-arm statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to 1977, a foreign company doing business in the United States
would be subject to in rem jurisdiction if it maintained assets in the United
605
States.
Shaffer closed that route to assertin£ jurisdiction when the Court
conflated in rem and in personam jurisdiction. 6
United States citizens injured abroad could still find a favorable forum
if the foreign corporation maintained a large enough presence in the United
607
608
States .
General jurisdiction could be useful in many instances.
But
without a clear explanation of its underlying theory, the Court initially, and
then radically, scaled back its availability.609
The developments seem at odds with the new smaller world in which
we live. Commerce and communications bring United States citizens into
contact with foreign companies far more frequently than at any other time in
6 10
history.
The Court's begrudging view of due process may effectively
parts manufacturers are worldwide companies doing millions of dollars of business in many
states. See, e.g., Newport Components Inc., v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671
F.Supp. 1525 (1987) (NEC is a Japanese computer parts manufacturer worth $2 billion doing
35% of its business internationally with a number of U.S. subsidiaries).
602
J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,2790 (2011).
603
I d. at 2790-91; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 11 2.
604
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
605
See supra text accompanying note 155.
606
Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,207-13 (1977).
607
For example, Audi did not object to the Oklahoma court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over it. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,288 (1980).
608
Rhodes, supra note 54.
609
See supra pp. 22-23.
6 10
See supra text accompanying notes 553-60.
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close the courthouse door on United States citizens who are harmed through
their interactions with foreign companies.
One might conclude that such a result, a narrowing of in rem and
general jurisdiction, are justified because specific jurisdiction produces more
sensible results and expands the reach of domestic courts.611 No doubt, the
former is often true as laying the venue in a place where a claim arises will
often result in a convenient place for litigants and witnesses. But depending
on which wing of the Court wins the purposeful availrnent battle within the
Court,612 the jurisdictional reach of domestic courts may be shrinking at a
time when access to justice may demand an expanded jurisdictional reach.
Further, Justice Kennedy's suggestion of a congressional solution is cold
613
comfort given the modem reality in Washington D.C.
Plaintiffs' lawyers would be well advised to build detailed records
during the pretrial motions stage of the proceedings. Figuring out how much
a plaintiff must show to convince Justices Breyer and Alito that a forei~n
defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States now looms large.61

6 11
Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 25) ("Justice Ginsburg repeated the
theme from Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. that after International Shoe specific
jurisdiction expanded to become the 'centerpiece of modem jurisdiction theory' while general
jurisdiction has played 'a reduced role.' The Court views personal jurisdiction as comprising
two separate sets and reasons that as specific jurisdiction increases, general jurisdiction must
decrease. While the expanded opportunities for specific jurisdiction have reduced the number
of siruations where plaintiffs need general jurisdiction, the Court offers no explanation for why
the constirutional expansion of one set would require a corresponding restriction in the
other.").
6 12
See discussion supra Part IV.b.ii.A.
613
See supra text accompanying notes 597-98.
614
See supra text accompanying notes 470-78.

